

BASIC
ESTIMATE

FROM THE FILE OF THE DIRECTOR
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

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PROPOSED BASIC ESTIMATE

ON

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

O. S. S.

copy to
William J. Donovan

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28, 1942

PROPOSED BASIC ESTIMATE

ON

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

SECRETBASIC ESTIMATE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARESUMMARY

A statement of the present psychological warfare situation is given, including an indication of the incentive, the objectives, and the formulation of the mission. The means available and opposed necessary to a basic estimate on psychological warfare are reviewed. This review consists of a consideration of the general political, economic, psychological and informational factors involved and of the specific factors revealed in the analysis of this history, present policies, agencies and operations of the psychological warfare program of the United States, Germany, Italy, and Japan.

The capabilities of Germany, Italy, and Japan in this sphere of warfare are analysed in the light of the situation which confronts them and the effects they desire.

Various courses of action for the United States are presented and analysed for their suitability, feasibility and acceptability for setting up an effective psychological warfare organization.

One course of action is chosen for immediate consideration, and recommendations are made as to measures that should be undertaken to put this course of action into effect.

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SECRETBASIC ESTIMATE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARECONTENTS

- I. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BASIS FOR SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
 - A. SUITABILITY
 - (1) Summary of the present psychological warfare situation
 - (2) Recognition of incentive
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 - (4) Formulation of the mission
 - B. FEASIBILITY AND ACCEPTABILITY
 - (1) Survey of the means available and opposed
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 - D. LISTING RETAINED COURSES OF ACTION
 - E. ANALYSIS OF RETAINED COURSE OF ACTION

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- (b) "to collaborate with interested nations to the end that all psychological warfare is in accord with strategy approved by the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff,
- (c) "to designate the executive agencies for implementing approved psychological warfare plans,
- (d) "to submit psychological warfare plans to the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Planners."

(3) Assigned objectives

To make analyses on which are based recommendations with respect to the proper functioning of psychological warfare waged by the United States.

Definition: "Psychological warfare is the integrated use of all means, moral and physical,--other than those of recognized military operations, but including the psychological exploitation of the result of those recognized military actions,--which tend to destroy the will of the enemy to achieve victory and to damage his political or economic capacity to do so; which tend to deprive the enemy of the support, assistance or sympathy of his allies or associates or of neutrals, or to prevent his acquisition of such support, assistance or sympathy; or which tend to maintain, increase or create the will to victory of our own people and allies and to maintain, increase or acquire the support, assistance and sympathy of neutrals."

The accomplishment of these ends demands:

- (a) general propaganda services, operating primarily against civilian groups and using mainly ideological appeals and news manipulation

- (b) operations

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1. subversive services engaged in sabotage, rumor-spreading, bribery, etc.
2. combat psychological warfare services directly attached to the armed forces, which act under the theatre commander and are exemplified by the German Propaganda Companies.
- (c) intelligence services engaged in accumulating information by research and espionage on fundamental social ideological and leadership vulnerabilities of enemy populations and on the current attitudes and morale of civilian and military groups, in addition to the usual military, naval, political, and economic information.

(4) Formulation of the mission

To make analyses on which are based recommendations with respect to the proper functioning of psychological warfare waged by the United States, in order to assist in the attainment of the objectives of the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff.

B. FEASIBILITY AND ACCEPTABILITY

(1) Survey of the means available and opposed

(a) General factors

1. Political factors

Available

Flexibility of a democratic structure

Alliances based upon mutual aim and effort rather than upon opportunism.

A multi-national people, compounded of all the national elements with which the military effort is engaged the world over as friend, neutral or enemy, represents positive elements of strength if turned to positive use.

Opposed

Nimbleness of policy provided by the centralization and absolute control in a totalitarian state

The absolute and complete political power of the totalitarian regimes.

Unity of foreign and domestic policy in the Axis nations

Similarity of ideology and methodology of the Axis nations

Greater cohesion of racially homogeneous states.

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2. Economic factors

Resources and industrial and transportation facilities of the United Nations.

Capacity, organization, and mobilization of industry in the United States.

Resources, and industrial and transportation facilities of the Axis and their occupied and satellite countries.

Earlier achievement by the totalitarian states of a total and absolute economy.

3. Psychological factors (expanded in detail later)

Greater self-reliance engendered in a democracy.

Enthusiasm and dependability of free and voluntary support for our war effort.

Prestige of the United States in material things and the hope of peoples abroad for assistance to come.

United States reputation in many parts of the world for disinterestedness.

The spirit of protest and revolt among the peoples oppressed by the Axis.

Development of high morale by totalitarian indoctrination and military success, and its maintenance by absolute political power.

Long pre-war period of training and discipline -- social and economic as well as military.

Absolute control of the State over all channels of influence upon the thoughts, opinions, and actions of the people.

The impetus derived from the revolutionary origin of the Axis movements

4. Information and counter-information measures

Potential development of agencies for the collection and analysis of information.

Total and absolute control of all sources and all dissemination of information.

Early and extensive development of a wide variety of intelligence agencies, particularly in Germany and Japan.

Early and elaborate development of espionage systems.

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SECRET(b) Specific factors1. United Statesa. History of psychological warfare in the United States

Psychological warfare of the modern sort appeared in the first World War. American activities were organized as follows:

1. General propaganda. This was carried on, in both the domestic and foreign fields, by the Committee on Public Information (the Croel Committee). It propagandized through press services, films, and pamphlets. It was the sole agency operating for the United States in the neutral and allied countries.

American propaganda in the last War was extremely effective in attaining immediate objectives and played no inconsiderable part in the final collapse of the Central Powers. Non-fulfilment of the promises implicit in Wilson's fourteen points and repudiation by the American people of the League of Nations did, however, undermine public confidence in America among both enemy and allied peoples and have seriously handicapped us to this day.

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SECRETv. The general nature of our propaganda

The aggressive and humanitarian foreign policy and war aims of President Wilson proved to be extremely effective weapons of psychological warfare, both in converting enemy peoples and in persuading those of neutral countries to sympathy with and active support for our war objectives. One of the main tasks of the propaganda agencies, including the subversive activities, was ensuring that Wilson's speeches were widely and accurately known within Germany. (See second paragraph of 1. above)

b. Presidential directives. Certain recent

Presidential directives relate generally to psychological warfare. OWI is directed to

"formulate and carry out, through the use of press, radio, motion picture and other facilities, information programs designed to facilitate the development of an informed and intelligent understanding, at home and abroad, of the status and progress of the war effort and the war policies, activities, and aims of the government".

OSB is set up to

"collect and analyze such strategic information" and to "plan and operate such special services as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff".

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- ii. Subversive activities. Most of these activities (which were extensive) were carried out by the British and French, operating from Switzerland and Holland. However, the democratic movement in Germany received strong encouragement from the Friends of German Democracy, made up of Americans of German descent operating under the guidance of the U. S. Government.
- iii. Combat propaganda. The principal organization for this was the Psychological (Propaganda) Subsection of the Military Intelligence Division. Most of the work consisted of distributing leaflets and pamphlets over the German lines and over cities by a variety of means. This agency cooperated with the C.P.I. and the propagandists of France and England. By the end of the war it had disseminated three million leaflets.
- iv. Intelligence agencies
The Psychological Subsection of M.I.D. was specifically instructed to study enemy propaganda. It studied and graphed enemy morale, using the information sources of the Intelligence Division as a whole.

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The functions of FCC are to

"record, translate, analyze and report to the Government on broadcasts of foreign origin, such activities to be carried on for three major purposes: (1) to keep abreast of propaganda pressures on this country and others in which the Government has an interest; (2) to cooperate with other agencies to interpret present conditions in and future policies of countries whose broadcasts are analyzed; (3) to make available to the Government news and information not available in media other than radio broadcasts."

The Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs is directed to

"formulate and execute programs, in cooperation with Department of State which, by effective use of governmental and private facilities in such fields as the arts and sciences, education and travel, the radio, the press, and the cinema, will further the national defense and strengthen the bonds between the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

"formulate, recommend, and execute programs in the commercial and economic fields which, by the effective use of governmental and private facilities, will further the commercial well-being of the Western Hemisphere."

The Board of Economic Warfare was established

"for the purpose of developing and coordinating policies, plans and programs designed to protect and strengthen the inter-national economic relations of the United States in the interest of national defense.

- c. Joint Chiefs of Staff directives. These directives are general, providing for the establishment of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee served by a Working Committee and an Advisory

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Committee. The duties of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, with the assistance of its subcommittees, are in general to initiate, formulate, and develop plans for psychological warfare, coordinate the psychological warfare functions of other U. S. agencies, collaborate with interested nations in accordance with strategy, designate implementing agencies, and submit plans to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. Existing agencies and operations.

1. General propaganda agencies

Office of War Information

Section on domestic information -- news, radio, publications and graphics, motion pictures, special publicity projects.

Section on overseas information (formerly FIS) -- press, radio, motion pictures.

Psychological Warfare Branch of MIS -- engaged in propaganda operations and limited intelligence services.

Special Service Branch of the War Department -- activities directed toward educating and propagandizing the armed forces (soldiers, guides, motion pictures, orientation courses, etc.)

Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs -- general propaganda to Latin America.

State Department, Division of Cultural Relations. Engaged in maintaining friendly relations primarily with Latin America and the Far East. Uses films, etc.

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Various private organizations.OBS, NBO, Mutual and WIUL
U.S.O.

Many others aimed at raising domestic morale, increasing U.S. prestige abroad, and improving America's comprehension of foreign problems.

ii. Subversive operations:

SA/G in OSS

iii. Combat propaganda operations:

Psychological Warfare Branch, MTS
Special Service Branch of War Department

iv. Intelligence agencies:

State Department

JIC

MTS (G-2)

ONI

A-2

Naval Air Intelligence

OSS - Research and Analysis Branch, including especially Psychology Division

Foreign Nationalities Branch

SA/D

Interdepartmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publications

OWI - Section on domestic information - Bureau of Intelligence.

Section on overseas information -

DRI - Intelligence Procurement Division

FBI

FCC - Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service

Private Agencies, such as the Gallup Poll in the domestic field, the Committee on National Morale, and the American Friends of German Freedom in the foreign field.

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SECRET2. The Axis -- GERMANYa. History of German psychological warfare

The shock of military defeat and political collapse in 1918 stimulated many German leaders to emphasize the need for greater attention to psychological factors in both defensive and offensive strategy. The rise of the Nazi movement provided an opportunity to try out new propaganda devices and to perfect old ones by testing them on the German people. By 1933, after 15 years of planning and experimentation, the German leaders were ready to put their ideas into practice on an international scale. At the outbreak of the war the Nazi plans for totalitarian psychological warfare were ready and had already been tested in numerous crises.

b. Present set-up

On the Home Front German propaganda is supplementing appeals to German desire for revenge and a place in the sun with appeals for support on the basis of the fear of annihilation by the enemy. On the Foreign Front Germany is now attempting to destroy the internal unity and the external cohesion of the United Nations, as well as to dissuade the few remaining neutrals from sympathy with the Allied cause.

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Germany's psychological warfare against her enemies is currently devoted primarily to subversive activities and combat propaganda. Radio broadcasts in considerable volume and variety are sent to Great Britain, the United States, and the U.S.S.R., although their effect is probably slight.

(For detailed operations, see Annex A)

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SECRET3. The Axis -- Italya. History of Italian psychological warfare

Italy was first in the field of "totalitarian" high-pressure propaganda. Fascist use of psychological warfare began in the struggles and quasi-civil warfare in which the party was born. Italy was on the victorious side, but had suffered terribly in military casualties and in economic welfare, and felt that she was being treated as a defeated nation. Highly lurid propaganda tactics were devised to win support for Mussolini. These efforts were at first made chiefly for home use, but after 1924-1925 were directed at Italian "colonials" abroad and at foreign opinion.

From the start, Fascists put psychological considerations ahead of all others. They consistently planned the psychological effects desired, visualized the appropriate acts upon which to base propaganda to get those effects, and then carried out those acts for the sake of the effects. Their technique helped greatly to create the illusion of dynamism in their

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movement, the insulation of which has in the past been one of our enemies' chief triumphs in the field of psychological warfare against their own peoples and against us.

b. Present set-up

Highly conscious of publicity values, Mussolini has seen to it that a great effort has gone into the creation for his use of a mechanism for psychological warfare, with a large budget.

The propaganda ministry has in the past spent all it could extract from a poor country and from gifts or goateel blackmail abroad. The total has been lower than the Nazi total expenditure, not because the Fascist will and imagination were weak but because the country is poor. Junkets to Italy were subsidized, "culture centers" set up to disseminate propaganda and enlist sympathizers, films were made (not very successfully), and radio work was carried on, especially directed at the Balkans and the Moslem world.

Radio broadcasts are the chief means employed in reaching outside Italy, although contacts with subversive and other elements were systematically cultivated.

(For detailed operations, see Annex B)

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4. The Axis -- JAPAN

a. History of Japanese psychological warfare
 Psychological warfare in Japan, so far as the home front is concerned, goes back to feudal days when the Shogun government developed procedures for controlling the thoughts and behavior of the population, procedures which have developed into the elaborate techniques of thought control practiced in Japan today.

Japanese methods for modern psychological warfare abroad are illustrated by the Manchurian affair in 1931, when private Japanese agents, sought to instigate revolts against the Manchurian authorities by printed appeals to the Manchurian populace to overthrow "bandits", and puppet Manchurians were all used to aid in the actual conquest of the area.

Since then all these techniques have been developed in the China and Southeast Asian areas. For both these regions, as well as North and South America, strong psychological intelligence work, so that military, political and psychological appeals and threats could be coordinated in effective action.

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An example of the evidence of intimate collaboration with the military intelligence in other countries is the relation between Japan and Estonia up to the time of the occupation of Estonia by the Red Army, which included the exchange of intelligence concerning the Soviet Union and a subsidy to the Estonian Military Intelligence.

b. Present set-up

A series of governmental reorganizations during the past few years aimed at eliminating inconsistencies and conflicts among the military forces, the diplomatic corps, and the propaganda agencies in Japan.

Japanese psychological warfare in South-east Asia is based upon her "Greater East Asia" appeal of Asia for the Asians. Her psychological warfare in the Western Hemisphere is designed to exploit existing lines of social cleavage.

(For detailed operations see Annex C)

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SECRET(2) Survey of theatres for psychological warfare.(a) Priority areas

1. Areas of resistance. In these areas the objective of psychological warfare is to maintain the status quo by impeding enemy military or political infiltration. All propaganda and other psychological activities in these areas aimed at impeding enemy infiltration shall be limited by the necessity of maintaining diplomatic and political status quo.
2. Areas of strategic preparation. These are areas of intensive psychological and physical infiltration in view of active operations aimed either at assisting a military offensive of our own or in repelling an enemy offensive. Since the task in these areas is to prepare for the military operations, all propaganda and other psychological warfare activities during the preparatory period must be integrated with military and strategic plans and other activities be subordinated thereto.
3. Allied Nations. Only territories where organized military resistance still prevails shall be included in this category. The objective of psychological warfare in these areas is to sustain morale and increase when possible participation in the war effort of the United Nations.
4. Areas of harassment. Regions which are not considered promising as bases for offensive operations and where no strategic disadvantage can result from the change in the diplomatic or political status quo shall be considered Areas of Harassment. In these areas psychological warfare attempts by every means to create difficulties for the enemy, stimulate rebellion, sabotage, guerrilla warfare and all forms of active or passive resistance as well as create doubt, fear, and social disorder among the elements of the population supporting the enemy.

(b) Groups upon which psychological warfare must be focused.

1. Enemy - demoralization and conversion toward and of hindering their war effort and furthering our own
 - a. Armed forces
 - b. Civilian populations
 - c. Leaders - to be misled, provoked to overconfidence and rashness, etc.

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2. United States - development and maintenance of incentive and morale
 - a. Armed forces
 - b. Civilian population
3. Allied - development and maintenance of enthusiastic support and good will
 - a. Armed forces
 - b. Civilian populations
4. The peoples of neutral countries - winning them to favorable attitudes toward us, unfavorable toward the enemy
5. The peoples of enemy occupied areas - their conversion to hindering the war effort of the enemy and furthering our own.
6. The peoples of United Nations occupied areas - development and maintenance of attitudes of good will toward us and ill will toward the enemy

(3) Conclusions as to relative effectiveness

The Axis has two major advantages in the waging of psychological warfare.

- (a) It began its intelligence, propaganda, and operational activities, both at home and abroad, years before the actual outbreak of hostilities. It therefore has the tremendous advantage of indoctrination at home, and the even greater advantage of an experienced and established intelligence system, as well as an organization for subversive operations.
- (b) The structure and methods of the totalitarian state provide for a practically complete and absolute control of all influences upon its people, and for the unity and coordination of all its war activities.

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The United States is placed at great disadvantage by the belatedness of its preparation of psychological warfare and by the paucity of its pre-war accumulation of psychological intelligence. Its psychological warfare activities also suffer from the lack of coordination always difficult in a democratic state. On the other hand, the United States enjoys the psychological advantage which lies in the cause of a nation that has been attacked. We also possess the prestige of great material capabilities. and finally, a potential strength lies in our enemies' weakness - the resentment of oppressed and misled peoples.

Another disadvantage to the United States is the attitude towards psychological warfare as an inherited and ingrained aversion of the people to devious methods, even in warfare.

IIa. CAPABILITIES OF THE ENEMY -- GERMANY

(See Annex D)

IIb. CAPABILITIES OF THE ENEMY -- ITALY

(See Annex E)

IIc. CAPABILITIES OF THE ENEMY -- JAPAN

(See Annex F)

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III DETERMINATION OF SUITABLE, FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE COURSES OF ACTION

A. ANALYSIS OF THE ASSIGNED OBJECTIVE

The assigned objective is to determine a plan for an integrated psychological warfare organization for the United States.

In conformity with the above definition of psychological warfare § 4. (37), a plan must be developed:

- (1) To organize and coordinate operational and intelligence resources and agencies (both public and private) so as effectively to conduct American psychological warfare focused upon six major groups--our own civilian and armed forces, those of our enemies, those of our Allies, and the peoples of neutral, enemy-occupied, and United Nations occupied areas.
- (2) To insure the coordination of propaganda and subversive operations with military operations in the United States or in the several foreign theaters, and to assure the execution of those plans.
- (3) To increase the striking power of the United States and our allies by raising their morale and securing the cooperation of occupied and neutral countries; to decrease the striking power of the enemy by lowering his morale and his capacities to fight, by stimulating resistance in the countries he occupies, and by dissuading neutral countries from cooperating with him.

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- (4) To encourage wherever possible the growth of political movements or ideologies sympathetic to the aims of American policy and to combat from their inception any political movements or ideologies which may constitute a long-term threat to the external or internal security of the United States; to our prestige and influence abroad or to the tranquility and security of any international system supported by the United States.

B. SURVEY OF COURSES OF ACTION

The JFMC might translate the Directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff into action by recommending to them any one of the following means:

- (1) Recognizing the Office of War Information as the proper agency to coordinate the psychological warfare activities of all other agencies.
- (2) Confering upon the JFMC mandatory powers to coordinate psychological warfare with respect to areas outside the United States attaching to it a representative of the State Department and expanding it into a real General Staff of Psychological Warfare.

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(3) Implementing the existing Directive establishing the JPWC;

(a) By attempting to secure the voluntary co-operation of psychological warfare agencies which are not under the direct control of the JCS.

(b) By strengthening and supervising the liaison between different psychological warfare agencies.

(c) By initiating and framing integrated plans of subversive operations and propaganda for submission to theater commanders, these plans to include both locally conducted activities under the direct control of the theater commander and the necessary support and assistance for such activities from the United States, from other theaters and from allied governments.

(d) By utilizing the supporting agencies of the JCS to report upon the psychological warfare activities of agencies outside the jurisdiction of the JCS and, when necessary, to use the supporting agencies to supplement or make good any apparent deficiency in our psychological warfare.

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C. APPLICATION OF TEST FOR SUITABILITY, FEASIBILITY
AND ACCEPTABILITY

1. First Course of Action.

- (a) Suitability - The course of Action is suitable from the point of view of setting up a smoothly operating machinery for the conduct of psychological warfare, but is not suitable from the point of view of obtaining integration of psychological warfare with military strategy because it is not under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (b) Feasibility - The course of action is feasible but only if the Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to place sole responsibility for the conduct of psychological warfare in civilian hands.
- (c) Acceptability - New directives would have to be issued by the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; conflicts of authority would impede and retard the organization of psychological warfare. The course of action does not appear acceptable under present conditions.

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2. Second Course of Action.

- (a) Suitability - The course of action is suitable.
- (b) Feasibility - The course of action appears feasible since it would not necessitate a drastic reorganization of existing psychological warfare agencies and would necessitate subordinating them to the policy control of the JFWC.
- (c) Acceptability - Acceptability is doubtful because of the resistance of present independent agencies to military control.

3. Third Course of Action.

- (a) Suitability - Suitability of this course of action depends upon voluntary cooperation of certain agencies. If this cooperation is obtained, the course of action is suitable.
- (b) Feasibility - The course of action is feasible since it involves no formal change in the existing situation.
- (c) Acceptability - The course of action is probably not acceptable since it would necessitate new directives.

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SECRETD. LISTING RETAINED COURSES OF ACTION

No single course of action seems at the moment to be completely suitable, feasible and acceptable. One course of action, however, appears feasible, acceptable and probably suitable, and even if it should develop later that it were not suitable, no serious loss would result from having attempted to follow it. The retained course of action, therefore, is to implement the existing Directive establishing the JPWC in the manner described in Section C (3).

If upon trial this course of action is found unworkable then the second course of action should be followed.

E. ANALYSIS OF RETAINED COURSE OF ACTION

1. Voluntary cooperation of agencies outside the jurisdiction of JCS would enable JPWC to coordinate all psychological warfare activities and integrate them with military strategy. Implementation of cooperation with outside agencies would involve:

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- (a) Submission to the JPWC of propaganda and publicity plans by the ONI, CIAA and other civilian agencies for approval from the viewpoint of military strategy
- (b) Directives from the JPWC to ONI, CIAA and other agencies stating the strategically desirable objectives for propaganda plans or operation.

2. Coordination of psychological warfare plans and their integration with military operations could be obtained by the JPWC under the retained course of action by the following means:

- (a) Directing the Psychological Warfare Branch, R3, to submit plans for combat-propaganda operations to the JPWC and directing ONI to submit plans for P.O.
- (b) By comparing such combat-propaganda and P.O. plans with the propaganda plans submitted, eliminating divergencies and by recommending to the agencies concerned that they hold consultations among themselves for the purpose of incorporating into the several plans provisions likely to render them mutually reinforcing.

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(c) By fitting the propaganda, combat-propaganda and S.O. plans submitted into the framework of an overall plan of psychological warfare strategy for submission to theatre commanders.

3. Supervisory and supplemental functions of the psychological warfare supporting agencies - including supplying of information to propaganda agencies - should be divided between the Psychological Warfare Branch, MIB, and OSS, and definite tasks assigned to each.

4. In addition to the organizational measures included in the retained course of action the setting up of an effective mechanism for psychological warfare necessitates rapid completion of the following studies:

(a) Inventory of facilities of all kinds for psychological warfare at the disposal of the United States, now or in the near future.

(b) Study should be made of the possibilities of psychological warfare in order to determine psychological warfare strategy. The following problems are indicative of those to be considered:

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1. Shall American psychological warfare attempt to repeat the ideological methods used in the last War or shall it be considered as a tactical auxiliary in military operations?
 - ii. Shall it be aimed primarily at projecting the collapse of enemy morale and organization, or shall it follow a policy of attrition by creating difficulties for the enemy in occupied territories, or can the two strategies be harmoniously combined?
 - iii. Shall American psychological warfare be completely independent or shall it be coordinated as closely as possible with the psychological warfare activities of our Allies?
- (c) An estimate of the results which American psychological warfare, if properly organized and conducted, can reasonably hope to obtain in various strategic areas by exploiting any substantial success of United Nations arms that may develop would be of great value in formulating plans.

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- (a) A program for greater utilization of various branches of the government and armed services, notably such branches as the army Special Services Branch, G.O.S., and of private agencies for psychological warfare.

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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

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1. That the JPWC formally approve the definition of psychological warfare submitted for information by the Subcommittee and revised to read as follows:

Psychological warfare is the coordination and use of all means, including moral and physical, by which the end is to be attained --other than those of recognized military operations, but including the psychological exploitation of the result of these recognized military actions, -- which tend to destroy the will of the enemy to achieve victory and to damage his political or economic capacity to do so; which tend to deprive the enemy of the support, assistance or sympathy of his allies or associates or of neutrals, or to prevent his acquisition of such support, assistance or sympathy; or which tend to create, maintain, or increase the will to victory of our own people and allies and to acquire, maintain, or increase the support, assistance and sympathy of neutrals.

The accomplishment of these ends demands and includes:

- (a) general propaganda services, operating primarily against civilian groups and using mainly ideological appeals and news manipulation;

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(b) operations -

- (1) subversive services engaged in sabotage, rumor-spreading, bribery, etc.;
- (2) combat psychological warfare services directly attached to the armed forces, which act under the theater commander and are exemplified by the German Propaganda Companies.
- (3) intelligence services engaged in accumulating information by research and espionage on fundamental social, ideological and leadership vulnerabilities of enemy populations and on the current attitudes and morale of civilian and military groups, in addition to the usual military, naval, political, and economic information.

2. That the JFMC submit through the Joint Staff Planners to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval the foregoing definition of psychological warfare.
3. That the JFMC base its planning upon the definition accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, elaborating for submission to theater commanders overall coordinated strategic plans for psychological warfare composed of the following elements:
 - (a) Plans for general propaganda operations.
 - (b) Plans for combat-propaganda operations.
(When the overall plan foresees American military operation in the target area.)
 - (c) Plans for subversive operations including the integrated use of sabotage and demolition work.

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organization and direction of underground political groups, whispering campaigns and other forms of fifth column activity within the target area, supported by appropriate secret activities in other areas likely to have a direct influence upon the target area.

4. That after the Joint Chiefs of Staff have informed the Office of War Information of their wishes, the J.P.W.C., on behalf of the J.O.S., will request the O.W.I. to submit plans for general propaganda to be reviewed for their suitability from the viewpoint of strategy and for coordination with subversive operations and combat-propaganda plans.
5. That the JPWC instruct the OSS to make available for this Committee such special psychological warfare intelligence as may be called for.

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SECRETANNEX AGerman Psychological Warfare Agencies and OperationsIntelligence Activities

1. Propaganda Ministry: monitoring foreign broadcasts, analyzing the world press, studying the world film market, maintaining an elaborate card index of personalities of importance in foreign countries, compiling background reports on foreign social systems and foreign attitudes.
2. War Ministry: reports on foreign military matters prepared by Military Attaches in Embassies and by agents of the coordinated intelligence command of the Wehrmacht.
3. Foreign Office: supervision of foreign service staff, including propaganda, espionage, and subversive activity, personnel, as well as old-style career diplomats and "Gibbontrop men," for contacts with social and business elites in enemy countries; also includes (since June 1937) a liaison office with the Foreign Organization of the Party, under Lohle.
4. Police: espionage agents organized in the Gestapo under Hammler.
5. Labor Front: under the guise of being a welfare organization for the German working class in foreign countries the Labor Front has "organized" these German laborers abroad into espionage and potential sabotage agents.
6. Party: through its Foreign Organization the Party has kept track of millions of Germans abroad and has encouraged the development of highly reliable German fifth columns in certain foreign countries.

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SECRET**Operational Activities**

1. **Propaganda Ministry:** spends an estimated 550,000,000 annually on propaganda, some 200,000,000 of which is used abroad. Broadcasts daily in more than 30 languages -- to the U.S. alone some 11 hours a day. Supplies free news for foreign press. Organizes carefully conducted tours through Germany for "cooperative" foreigners. Distributes tons of propaganda literature in foreign countries and aims to build up good will and respect for German cultural achievements through such agencies as the former German Library of Information in New York. Subsidizes the showing of German films -- features, educationals, newsreels -- abroad. Sponsors many "cultural" organizations the aim of which is to develop friendly relations with Germany. Supplies personnel for "Propaganda Companies" in Wehrmacht.
2. **War Ministry:** besides the usual operations of military intelligence, the High Command controls the activities of the Propaganda Companies, composed of photographers, writers, composers, actors, etc. from the Chamber of Culture in the Propaganda Ministry. These Propaganda Companies have three functions: entertaining the troops; recording the war for the home audience by radio, motion pictures, sketches, and news articles; and demoralizing enemy troops and civilians near the front line by numerous ingenious techniques of combat propaganda.
3. **Police:** The Security Police supplements the work of occupation troops by employing terroristic measures against the enemy's underground activities. The Foreign Security Police are saboteurs like those recently arrested by the FBI in this country. These sabotage agents are given special training in Berlin and must spend at least one year in the country to which they are assigned before completion of this technical preparation. Willing "foreign Germans" constitute the most suitable personnel for this work.

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- iv. Foreign Office: Using the notion of diplomatic immunity the German consulate and embassies have filled their staffs with all sorts of undercover agents, including military personnel. In the German occupation of Bergen, Norway, the 50 men in the German Consulate there were instrumental in taking strategic positions in the city before the troops had arrived. Since June 1937 the Foreign Office served as the channel by means of which Berlin maintained contact with such fifth columnist groups as the Foreign Organization of the Party, or the German Labor Front organization abroad. In the Argentine, e.g., the local units of the German Trade Union organization received extensive funds through the German legation in Buenos Aires.
- v. Police: By means of its internal disciplinary and policing system the NSDAP maintains surveillance over all Germans abroad, and thus constrains them -- using persuasion, bribery, blackmail, etc. -- to do their part in aiding the Third Reich. Most influential organization in this connection is the Austrian Organization.
- vi. Labor Front: Mainly concerned with espionage and sabotage in foreign industrial establishments. Probably collaborator with the Austrian Secret State Dienst.

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ANNEX B

Italian Psychological Warfare Agencies and OperationsIntelligence activities

1. The Ministry of Popular Culture (i.e. Propaganda): has intelligence sections which draw information on social, political, cultural, and economic conditions at home and abroad from its own agents, as well as from the intelligence sections of army, navy, and air force. It also monitors foreign broadcasts, keeps track of Italian organizations and personalities abroad, and supervises the actions and pronouncements of such as it controls.
2. Army, navy, and air force intelligence sections: perform all normal functions of such sections, but serve also the Ministry of Popular Culture and are served by it.
3. Foreign Ministry intelligence work is under the ministerial direction of Ciano, and hence of Mussolini. It has functioned closely at all times both on the intelligence side and the policy side, with the Ministry of Popular Culture.
4. The Ovra or secret police has worked chiefly in Italy, but through the CAO (Centro Americano di Operazioni) and parallel sections for work abroad has kept data upon Fascists and anti-Fascists and influential foreigners for many years. Now integrated with and subordinated to the Gestapo, it is scarcely an independent instrument for psychological warfare.
5. The Fascist Party abroad, integrated with the Ministry of Popular Culture, has organized F. I. S. I., whose members have in turn taken the lead in gathering data and in promoting all activities designed to further the Duce's interests. It is subdivided into elements which work on intellectuals, on laborers, on veterans, etc., to enlist their support of Fascismo and to use them as sources of information.

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Operational activities

- i. The Ministry of Popular Culture: complete control over the Italian press (including books, newspapers, magazines, etc.), foreign press, propaganda and technical services (such as film and radio). The Press Office issues a daily mimeographed form which is mailed to almost every Italian newspaper and specifies what must be "played up", and what news must be omitted.
- ii. The Foreign Ministry: functions closely with the Ministry of Popular Culture.
- iii. The Fasci all'Estero is the Italian organization abroad whose members have chosen obedience to Fascism. When the work of the Fasci All'Estero caused political embarrassment, it was found more effective to entrust a great deal of the work to diplomatic and consular officers in foreign countries.
- iv. The Dante Alighieri Society: agency for distributing Italian information in the Americas and abroad.
- v. Casa d'Italia: cultural and "after work" purposes; function as propaganda centers.
- vi. Associazione Nazionale Combattenti (National Association of Veterans): has some of the ablest Fascist agents.
- vii. Italian industries under the Fascist Government have had interests abroad through which they were able to spread propaganda -- for example, in electrical, automobile or airplane companies or banks.
- viii. In addition to these agencies, there is the Italian language press, made up of about 300 publications in North and South America.

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- ix. The Dopolavoro, an "after work" agency, similar to our Community Centers, is the principal channel for reaching the masses. There is no part of the Kingdom, islands, or colonial possessions where the people are not subject to Dopolavoro influence by means of entertainments, films, radio and printed matter. It is the most potent and effective agency of the Government, and has unequalled facilities.
- x. The "Opera Nazionale Balilla" is an effective organization to indoctrinate all youth from the ages of 6 to 21 years and spreads all precise military and Fascist propaganda.
- xi. The Fascist Militia is another effective organization.
- xii. The Secret Police - OVRA - work in harmony with the propaganda system and the "Opera Nazionale Repubblicana Anti-Fascista" operates in hotels, restaurants, apartment houses, etc., as a counter-information agency. The Giustizia operation in considerable numbers.
- xiii. The entire population is organized into units for the dissemination of propaganda; for example: school children, university students, factories, industries, farms, banks, offices. The party leaders pass down all orders and items of propaganda through the heads of these units. All "spontaneous popular demonstrations" are ordered by higher authorities and unit leaders.

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ANNEX C

Japanese Psychological Warfare Agencies and Operations1. Intelligence Organization

Agencies of propaganda intelligence include the Information Bureau (Johoku) of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Intelligence Sections of the General Staff Office and the Naval Staff Board. The Department of Foreign Affairs is known to have maintained special public opinion observers in various foreign centers during recent years. The Japanese Army and Navy have long been interested in propaganda warfare and it is believed that the military and naval attaches included propaganda intelligence in their assignments. The Department of Overseas Affairs may also engage in intelligence of this sort.

2. General Propaganda

The Board of Information (Joho Kyoku), an agency directly under the Cabinet, is the planning and coordinating agency for all general propaganda. When organized in 1940 it was made up of a President, a Vice-President, and 14 councilors. It employed 62 secretaries, 10 clerks and 1 engineer. On it were represented the War, Navy, Home, Communications, and Foreign Affairs Departments. It had five bureaus the third of which was authorized to deal with matters pertaining to information, publicity, and cultural work abroad.

The functions of the Board were broadly defined to include the gathering of information and publicity concerning matters forming the basis for the execution of national policies, control of the press and publications under the National General Registration Law, and guidance and supervision of publicity concerning national policies the production of pictures, phonograph records, the distribution of films, and other entertainments.

Imperial Headquarters, organized only in wartime, has Army and Navy Press Sections. These issue official announcements. They appear to be independent of the Board of Information.

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The Department of Foreign Affairs, on last report, had three units concerned with the dissemination of propaganda abroad: the Bureau of Cultural Works, the Board of Tourist Industry, and the Bureau of Information. The exact relationship between these agencies and the Board of Information is not known. Foreign service officials stationed abroad served as agents in the dissemination of material and in the employment of local press agents.

The Colonization Bureau (Takumu kyoku) of the Department of Overseas Affairs is responsible for the encouragement and control of organizations among the overseas Japanese and for propaganda to them.

The Japan Tourist Bureau is supported by the Department of Railways. In pre-war days it distributed sentimental literature, movies, and slides on Japan and cooperated with other agencies including the government-subsidized N.Y.K. in providing free or cheap tours to school teachers, writers, and business men.

The Department of Home Affairs exercises certain powers of press censorship while the Department of Communications controls telephone, telegraph, and wireless communication. The exact division of labor between these two agencies and the Board of Information is not known.

Domei, the official Japanese news agency, is nominally a private organization. It is largely supported by the Japan Broadcasting Association however, and is under government control (probably through the Board of Information). For years it has been the chief source of news for American and other foreign correspondents. Its news services are provided to Japanese papers throughout the world at nominal cost. Its excellent staff of foreign correspondents is no doubt of great service in propaganda intelligence.

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The Japan Broadcasting Association has a monopoly of broadcasting in Japan both short and long wave and for both local and foreign consumption. It is ostensibly private but is under government control, probably through the Board of Information, and is supported by legal charges levied on radio set owners.

The Society for International Cultural Relations (Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai) was supported partly by contributions from wealthy Japanese and partly by a Department of Foreign Affairs subvention. It has engaged extensively in international cultural propaganda of all sorts.

The International Students Association (Kokusai Gakusei Kyokai) gives advice, support and instruction to foreign students in Japan. In the past it has particularly cultivated American-born Japanese, and students from Latin America or Southeast Asia.

The Department of Education, in addition to controlling school texts throughout Japan, has in recent years been active in the development of courses of instruction in Japanese for residents in areas occupied by the Japanese.

The Japan-Thailand Association is typical of a considerable number of organizations sponsored by Japanese high in official or social circles for the cultivation of relations with other nations.

Subversive Operations Organization

Subversive operations are organized largely through numerous unofficial Japanese organizations, most important of which is the Black Dragon Society. Such work is guided, but probably not fully controlled, by Army and Navy Intelligence Sections.

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The Black Dragon Society has in the past been active in collaboration with military authorities in both intelligence and sabotage. It is probably still so used. It is also useful for liaison with subversive elements of various nationalities, such as the Sakdalistas in the Philippines and the India Independence League of Japan. The private initiative of organizations such as the Black Dragon Society is to a considerable degree responsible for the long-range and large-scale organization of Japanese espionage and fifth-column activity in Southeast Asia.

3. Combat propaganda activities

- (a) Radio and loud-speaker appeals to opposing forces to lay down their arms.
- (b) Radio appeals to native peoples during the course of invasion to overthrow governors, to refuse to carry out scorched earth policies, and in general to cooperate with invading Japanese.
- (c) Radio shock tactics aimed at frightening the enemy into giving up.
- (d) Leaflets stressing Japanese strength and past success, past injustices of rulers to natives, with appeals to the latter to kill their oppressors.

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ANNEX D

SECRET

A. SURVEY OF THE ENEMY'S PROBLEM

(1) Summary of the enemy situation

Germany faces the dual problem of maintaining domestic support for an aggressive war and undermining the will of the enemy to resist. On the home front, German propaganda has supplemented appeals to German desire for revenge and a place in the sun with appeals for support on the basis of fear of annihilation by the enemy in the event of a defeat. On the foreign front, the development of the military-diplomatic situation has forced Germany to abandon her plan of immobilizing the allies of the power to attack, and has compelled her to attempt instead to destroy the internal unity and external cohesion of the United Nations. A subsidiary objective, but one more likely to succeed, is the prevention of further gains of strength to the Allied cause from the few remaining neutrals. Meanwhile, her conquered countries must be urged to greater efforts.

The principal fronts of this psychological warfare are: (Not listed in order of priority)

1. European neutrals: Sweden, Unoccupied France, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland

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2. European occupied countries
3. Northwest Africa
4. The Middle East, including Turkey
5. Latin America, especially the Argentine and Chile, the only Latin American countries which still have diplomatic relations with the Axis
6. Italy and Japan: Germany's allies
7. United Nations

(2) Effects desired

- (a) To convert enemy, conquered, and neutral countries to an acceptance of German ideals and domination.
- (b) To convince them of Germany's invincibility.
- (c) To instill a false sense of security.
- (d) To undermine their respect for their own democratic values.
- (e) To exploit internal political, social and ethnical cleavages.
- (f) To persuade them, with such tempting ideological concepts as the "New Order," that cooperation with Germany would be the most beneficial course of action.

B. ENEMY CAPABILITIES(1) Strengths and weaknesses inherent in the situation(a) Strengths

1. Germany's greatest asset on the foreign

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front was the defeatism, pessimism, and pacifism bred in her enemies by the bitter experiences of 1914-1919. This was likewise Germany's greatest domestic morale problem. By systematically building up a powerful military establishment and by conducting her foreign relations in an aggressive and self-confident manner, she was able both to reassure the German people and to demoralize her enemies.

2. The lack of confidence among the peoples of the world in the ability of the United States and her allies to attain the common objectives of the war as so far expressed.
3. Central geographical position, facilitating broadcasting, intelligence, and subversive activities. Full use was made of these advantages long before the outbreak of hostilities.
4. Relatively long tradition of academic and military studies in problems of psychological warfare.
5. Rich traditions of German sociological and anthropological scholarship, which have resulted in the amassing of quantities of data on foreign cultures and attitudes.

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the developing of a method
for analyzing and manipulating them.

6. Abundance of technological skill, notably in radio.
7. Willingness of German leadership to accept new techniques: The anti-traditionalism of the Nazi ideology and the period of forced disarmament both stimulated the development of revolutionary methods.
8. Elements of the Nazi ideology appealing to large numbers of non-Germans: anti-Semitism, hostility to organized labor, anti-parliamentarism.
9. Ability of a dictatorship to operate on unencumbered funds.

(b) Weaknesses

1. Domestic opposition to Nazism: tradition of trade unionism; organized religion; strength of Communism before 1933.
2. German fatalism
This psychological factor renders the Germans docile and willing to contribute to the war effort in order to stave off defeat, but makes for instability in the face of reverses.
3. Abuse of propaganda and censorship, reducing public confidence in official utterances.

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4. Opposition of conquered peoples: accumulated hatred and hope of revenge; presence in Germany of foreign labor capable of subversive activity.
5. Limitations of the ideology, which offers a bright future only to German "racial comrades."
6. Conflicts of personal ambition which arise within and may undermine a totalitarian rule.

(c) Strength and weakness of the organizational set-up.

(a) Strength

Perhaps the greatest strength of the German apparatus for psychological warfare is the recognition of its critical importance by the Nazi leadership. No cost is spared in prosecuting psychological warfare. The centralized and hierarchical Nazi system of government permits quick action and maximum coordination of the many agencies engaged in psychological warfare.

(b) Weakness

The very effectiveness of the Nazi psychological warfare machinery works against it. As the war lengthens, the world at large, including perhaps some sections of the German people, have had an opportunity to examine and unmask the techniques of Nazi deception and treachery. For those whose eyes have been opened by this experience one aspect of German activities in the field of

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psychological warfare has been to awaken
an attitude of hostility and distrust toward
everything German which it will be difficult
even for Nazi Germany to eradicate.

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ANNEX E

A. SURVEY OF THE ENEMY'S PROBLEM(1) Summary of the enemy situation

Fascist leadership has faced the problem of persuading a very non-bellucose population, still bearing hurts from the last war, inflation, the depression, Ethiopia, Spain, and over-taxation to fight in alliance with the most feared and hated nation in Europe, for territories few Italians wanted. Added to these problems was the graver one, from the point of view of Fascist leaders, that Italy was wearying of Fascism itself.

The survival of Britain, the terrible costs of the Greek, Russian, and Libyan wars, and the entry of the United States into the war have further encumbered Fascist psychologists. Their efforts have been directed at belittling the enemies, at exalting Axis invincibility, and at making promises, now reiterated over eighteen years, of better times when these glorious tasks have been achieved.

(2) Effect desired

The main tasks of Italian psychological warfare are to prevent internal disintegration, and by working through Italian colonials chiefly in the Western Hemisphere to give what help it can to German efforts there.

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~~SECRET~~(b) Weaknesses

1. All skeptical, shrewd Italians (who prize shrewd skepticism) are now susceptible to a propaganda which compliments them for having taken Fascism with a grain of salt.
2. Discontent with a visibly worsening material situation.
3. Warmness with Fascism.
4. Fear of Italy becoming a battleground.
5. Antipathy to German "occupanti."
6. Low state of Italian morale.

(2) Strength and weakness in the organizational set-up(a) Strength

The strength in the Fascist set-up for psychological warfare has been chiefly the strength of Mussolini himself as publicity man, editor, mouthpiece, stage designer, plot-writer, and chief actor.

In Italy all information facilities and all propaganda and psychological operations facilities are under the Ministry for Popular Culture. This makes for an effective integration.

The Italian Secret Police, backed up by the Gestapo, is so highly efficient as to render difficult any collection of low morale.

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SECRET(b) Weakness

The greatest weakness in the whole imposing pattern of bureaus and organizations lies in the fact that too few of the human beings engaged in doing the actual work care very much that it be done fast and efficiently. That attitude stems partly from quiet contempt for Fascism, partly from indifference, and partly from an attitude toward time and grinding accurate detail work which defies correction. Graft and nepotism have placed incompetents in office and discouraged competent men.

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ANNEX F

A. SURVEY OF THE FINEY'S PROBLEM

(1) Summary of the enemy situation

Japan's decision to take over the Southeast Asian and Western Pacific area by force meant declaring war on the United States and Britain because of their interests in the area and presented a situation which needed justification to the people at home and the people in Asia, as well as to such neutral areas as Latin America.

Japan's psychological warfare in Southeast Asia, based upon early studies of the social attitudes of the native peoples, paid her big dividends in her southward drive and in convincing her to do so. Thus her psychological warfare has undoubtedly been based on the aspect of "Asia for the Asians" and of freedom of the native peoples from European rule, although it has also been a pointed lance at capitalism, imperialism, and race, social, and religious lines of division among the United Nations.

(2) Current situation(a) In Southeast Asia

1. To persuade the native peoples, as a result, to join Japan in the fighting

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the various Caucasian overlords.

2. To intimidate the British, Dutch, and Americans to give up without fighting.
3. To gain the active cooperation of the Malaysians in reestablishing the areas economically and politically, in order to create a Greater East Asia with Japan as the directing (and exploiting) nation.

(b) In the United States

1. To exploit lines of social cleavage in the United States through appeals to ethnic, social, and religious groups with different interests, some of them with grievances against the groups in political power.
2. To divide the United States from Britain and Russia.

(c) In China

1. To persuade the Chungking government that further resistance is useless.
2. To discredit the Chungking government in the eyes of the Chinese people.

(d) In Latin America

1. To persuade these countries to remain neutral.

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2. To persuade them to unite in opposing the United States war efforts.

B. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

(1) Strengths and weaknesses inherent in the situation

(a) Strengths

1. The widespread resentment in Southeast Asia of the white man as ruler and exploiter, together with the fact that Japan is herself an Asiatic nation which has successfully defied the white man in Russia, Manchuria, Burma, N.E.I., the Philippines and more recently in Indo-China - this situation giving great force to the slogan "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere".
2. The extremely small numbers of ruling Europeans in relation to the large native populations.
3. Japan as aggressor is a single unified nation, whereas the defenders of the region are from different nations and speak different languages.
4. Japan's unified communication facilities, compared with the scattered and poorly coordinated ones of the various European powers in the area.
5. Japan's high morale at home. The people

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believe wholeheartedly in Japan's mission
believe wholeheartedly in Japan's mission

1. and in her ability to win the war.
6. The complete psychological unpreparedness of the United States for the war of aggression.
7. America's distance from the field of operations is a psychological as well as a physical asset to Japan.
8. The series of defeats China has suffered during the past decade constitute a Japanese strength. Japan occupied most of the important coastal areas as well as the sections of the interior.
9. The countries of Latin America have always borne the United States as a neighborly hearing neighbor.
10. The long unprotected coast of many Latin American countries opened a way of attack that constituted a Japanese asset.

(b) consequences

1. The prestige of the United States in some parts of Southeast Asia. Many Filipinos are willing to rid their lands of the Japanese out of the Philippines.
2. The several million Chinese troops who are now in the area of Southeast Asia.

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3. Japan's arrogant policy since her conquests may be counted on to have disillusioned many Malayan and Indonesian nationalists who now wish to see Japan defeated. Brutal policy in many conquered areas.
4. The entrance of the United States in the war and lend lease aid have given China psychological strength to continue resistance to Japan.
5. In the United States, the will to fight, once attacked, is great. Japan grossly underestimated this aspect of American psychology when she attacked Pearl Harbor.
6. Desire for liberty and revenge on the part of the more evolved elements such as the Filipinos, Koreans, and the Thai.
7. Close ties of Latin-American republics with the United States, and their fear of Japanese fifth-columns.

(2) Strength and weakness in the organizational set-up

(a) Strength

As a result of a series of government reorganizations during the past few years, the military forces, the diplomatic corp., and the propaganda agencies in Japan have all been made to

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work together in such a way as to reduce inconsistency and conflict. This has given great strength to her psychological warfare, particularly in Southeast Asia.

(b) Weakness

While the various branches of the government in Japan have been coordinated, there is evidence that there still exist inter-bureaucratic jealousies, that the radio broadcasters do not always know what the army is doing, etc.

Japanese intelligence activities have proven weak in their analyses of United States and Latin America, partly from the ineptness of Japanese propaganda to this country.

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APPENDIX TO ANNEX F

Aspects of Japanese Propaganda to America
Showing Lack of Insight into American Reactions

The evaluation of the successfulness of broadcast material is usually left to the individual opinion of "competent observers" who may disagree widely among themselves. There is considerable agreement that Japanese broadcasts, especially in the early months of the war, were poor from the technical and propagandistic standpoint. Persons who have heard such broadcasts indicate that the language was often imperfect, and attempts at humor and drama "hummy." More important, perhaps, but at the same time harder to evaluate are instances in which major propaganda themes were so illadvisedly taken as to have exactly the opposite effect intended. The following are thought to be examples of such themes:

1. Telling Americans that they are soft, luxury-loving, unwilling to sacrifice or to fight. Describing to Americans from Tokyo a supposed state of extreme chaos and panic existing in America. Accusing American troops of cowardice. (Errors of this general nature are common to many broadcasters talking to enemy audiences. It is a truism that insulting your audience as a whole is never effective until that audience is near real panic and can be included in the actual sphere of military operations.)

2. A standard Japanese treatment of MacArthur's escape to Australia was to describe it as an extreme act of cowardice. MacArthur was portrayed as deserting his men and his duty to save

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his wife and child and to secure his own personal safety. From the standpoint of Japanese values, MacArthur's act might appear in this light. The Japanese apparently missed the fact, however, that to the American audience, the escape was a morale boost. This is a typical example of expecting an enemy audience's values to be similar to one's own.

3. The extreme claims of "total annihilation" of American naval forces which were made after Pearl Harbor and after every subsequent naval engagement, including Midway and the current Solomons encounter, probably negate some of the propaganda value of the genuine Japanese victories. Such assertions immediately fit into the popular American stereotype of "propaganda," while more qualified descriptions might well have been believed.

4. Other propaganda boners probably include the allegations of American atrocities, especially the Quezon murder which was so completely refuted. A general lack of humor, presence of inappropriate humor, and dullness are also said to characterize Japanese broadcasts.

Appended are excerpts from Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service "Quarterly Review" on Japanese programs to America, and excerpts from Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service "Weekly Analysis" of Foreign broadcasts illustrating various of the points just mentioned.

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"Quarterly Review" of the Foreign Broadcast
Monitoring Service of FCC, Covering from
December 1, 1941 to March 1, 1942, pp. 34-35

General characteristics: Tokyo's broadcasts to North America are, on the whole, less organized and show less insight than those beamed to Pacific islands and the Asiatic continent. There is no successful accommodation to the needs and habits of the typical American listener, except perhaps in the case of the "Prisoners' Information Service." Because Americans are accustomed to taking a certain amount of entertainment, subtlety and humor with their "propaganda," Tokyo's humorless attacks on American leaders would antagonize all but the most anti-Administration listeners.

Radio Tokyo has little if any regard for truthful reporting. The speakers regularly and blandly announce the capture of military objectives long in advance of the actual capture, and even in the absence of any capture. It puts words in the mouths of American leaders, and twists events unrecognizably. It never admits a Japanese defeat or setback, and in the four years of war in China the admissions even of "planned withdrawals" could probably be counted on the fingers of one hand. If the broadcasts were watched with this in mind, their lack of reliability and consistency would leave the radio open to almost daily counter-attacks. . . .

Mechanical Characteristics: The broadcasts are often handled sloppily from a purely mechanical point of view. Programs are shifted to different schedules and frequencies without previous notice. The speakers tumble over their lines as though they had never rehearsed. Often the English is very poor, both in pronunciation and grammar. Dozens of completely different news items are crowded into each new broadcast so the listener is apt to carry away no specific clearly-remembered information. Perhaps the best thing that can be said for the mechanics of Japanese broadcasts to North America is that the transmitters operate on such powerful wave-lengths that they can be received on ordinary short-wave attachments, at least on the West Coast.

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Excerpts from "Weekly Analysis of Official Foreign
Broadcasts" of the Foreign Broadcast
Monitoring Service of RCO

December 10

The stupidity of the American military command is dwelt on. Tall stories are related of American forces shooting down their own planes, killing their own men, sinking their own boats. Americans are crying with one voice, "Where are our famous defenses?" "Why are we such easy marks for the Japanese," "A winter of discontent is settling down over America."

January 20

Tokyo reports that American sailors on freighters plying between North and South America are going on strike "to the great embarrassment of American marine authorities." The sailors are saying, "We don't want to risk our lives by navigating the dangerous American coast under the unreliable protection of the American Navy."

February 10

The atmosphere in America is one of nightmarish, hysterical instability because Americans, like the French, are unwilling to give up their everyday luxuries.

March 6

Helplessness of so-called democracies at war . . . one of the major evils . . . in America's "mixed racial strain" which militates against unity and commonality of purpose . . . soft living, as Tokyo puts it, is another deep-seated source of American weakness. The defenders of Wake who lived in the lap of luxury in a formidable equipped fortress surrendered meekly after resisting only one day.

March 13

American opinion: the "black crime" being perpetrated against 120,000 innocent Japanese and Nisei on the West Coast is officially condemned by a spokesman of the Board of Information who seizes the opportunity to express their "heart-felt sympathy" for the victims of American xenophobia. Tokyo contrasts its own policy toward civilians in occupied areas (who are "allowed all freedom possible") with the barbaric savagery of the United States.

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SECRETMarch 26

Nichi-Nichi editorial on "hysterical . . . wanton . . . brutal . . . defeatist" destruction of the Japanese cherry blossoms "on the eve of their blooming."

March 26

"A bunch of suckers": Tokyo describes MacArthur's escape as being a great blow to the rank and file of the men left "in the jaws of death" and "deserted in the hell-hole of Batuan." In Japan, American listeners are repeatedly told, MacArthur would be executed for abandoning his helpless comrades in their hour of greatest need. The radio puts on a playlet, called "MacArthur's Last Stand," laid in the general's "bedroom-study" at Corregidor, in which General and Mrs. MacArthur and High Commissioner Sayre all play ignominious roles. President Quezon, the hero, tries to prevail upon MacArthur to stick to his post, but the General replies, "I'm getting out of here. We've been a bunch of suckers for these blockheads at Washington.... Say, I've got it! The defense of the Philippines will be left to Jonathan Vainwright. He deserves that 'honor,' the rat. I think I've been the cockeyed hero just a bit too long." If Tokyo has its way, General MacArthur will not long remain on the pedestal where the American people have placed him.

April 18

Captured American soldiers are described as talking all in a most unsoldierly manner and making treasonous "confessions" concerning their president and superior officers. "Amazing are the disclosures of these so-called heroes of Batuan."


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FOREIGN PROPAGANDA AGENCIES


DOMESTIC PROPAGANDA AGENCIES

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100250003-4


Existing Organization of Agencies concerned with Psychological Warfare- *(Corresponding to Second Source of A)*



Possible Organization for Psychological Warfare



Principal Psychological Warfare Agencies—Japan (Broad Outline)



Principal Psychological Warfare Agencies - Italy (Broad Outline)

FASCIST PARTY <i>(Home and Abroad)</i>	MINISTRY of POPULAR CULTURE	FOREIGN MINISTRY	ARMED FORCES
Fasci all 'Estero <i>(Directing activist leaders)</i> Associazione Nazionale Combattenti <i>(National association of veterans)</i> Dopolavoro <i>(Recreation and Social - film, radio, print, etc., in cooperation with Ministry of Popular Culture)</i> Opera Nazionale Balilla <i>(Militaristic youth organization)</i> Fascist Militia <i>(Largely in Italy)</i> Opera Volontaria <i>Repressione Anti-Fascista - OVRA</i> <i>(Secret police dominated by Gestapo)</i>	Special bureaus to control and/or operate companies, associations, etc., with respect to: Press Home Stefani Agency Radio Home and abroad Films Publications <i>(Cooperation with Ministry of Education)</i> Cultural Societies Domestic (learned, artistic, etc.) Foreign, especially, Dante Alighieri Society Case d' Italia Intelligence Sections on Activities of Italians abroad Cooperation with Armed Forces	Personnel drawn from Fascist Party Cooperates with Fascist Party and Ministry of Popular Culture in all practical affairs: finances, diplomatic immunity, communications, decorations, etc.	Assisted by Ministry of Popular Culture: (a) Morale-building, indoctrination activities. (b) Combat propaganda Also assisted by Fascist Party (especially Dopolavoro personnel) for recreation and social activities

Other Agencies Integrated into Psychological Warfare Work

All responsible Italian officers, leaders, etc., of schools, universities, factories, business organizations, labor syndicates, banks, shipping and insurance companies, agrarian organizations, etc., at home and abroad must use such organizations to promote Fascist Party propaganda as directed by the Ministry of Popular Culture. Party leaders pass down all orders and items of propaganda through the heads of these organizations.

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The symbols shown on the charts of United States Organizations stand for the following agencies:

BEW	= Board of Economic Warfare
CIAA	= Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
FBI	= Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBMS	= Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service, FCC
FN	= Foreign Nationalities Branch, OSS
JCS	= Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIC	= Joint Intelligence Committee
JIPWC	= Joint Psychological Warfare Committee
JSP	= Joint Staff Planners
MIS	= Military Intelligence Service, G-2
ONI	= Office of Naval Intelligence
OSB	= Office of Strategic Services
OWI	= Office of War Information
PWB	= Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2
PW Unit	= Psychological Warfare Unit
R & A	= Research and Analysis Branch, OSS
SSB	= Special Service Branch, OSS
SA/N	= Special Activities, OSS
SA/G	
WIPC	= War Information Policy Committee

(2016)

S E C R E TJ.P.W.C. 36COPY NO. 1AUGUST 29, 1942JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEBASIC ESTIMATE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARENote by the Secretary

The enclosure, a basic estimate of the situation in the field of psychological warfare, prepared by the Office of Strategic Security, is recommended by the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee for approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Mr. Taylor
FROM: Colonel Donovan

You were to make the arrangements with Blackney
for our cooperation on this paper.

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2-2-5) Psychological Factors

I. REACTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN AMERICAA. A.1. United States

The reaction of the American public to the assumed situation is likely to be that of only momentary sympathetic regret. Public opinion experts report that in general the average American has little conception of Russia's role in the war. Russia is a vague, far-off place with bizarre names, whose people are doing a good job of defending their country. The American people do not see that the lot of Russia is important in our own military effort. Thus, the public would, if affected at all, show a heightened will-to-fight, enhancing the characteristic, though unrealistic, attitude that the United States will have to win the war pretty much herself. Confusion and disillusionment would occur only later with specific and continued reverses of American armed forces.

2. Canada

Public opinion is much like that in the United States. There is little reaction to Russia's role, the orientation being toward the United States and England. Some elements of the people (the French Canadians) are not highly enthusiastic about the war even now, but in general the Canadians would follow the reaction of the United States. In Canada there are two schools of thought - one win the war by attacking enemy at a distance - other (French Canadian) defense at home (Canada) - Education of latter faction indicated.

3. England

Although present general will-to-fight is high, it is not certain that the assumed situation would not demoralize it. Confidential opinion studies in England reveal that the English have very much identified their prospects with the continued fight by the Russians. These

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Statistics reveal that the English show a high degree of confidence, hope and belief in Russia. Thus, the present situation may result in a greater reduction of the volume of direct aid from America and (2) skill and cunningness of the Allied propagandists in developing the theme that the Russian campaign was a fortunate break for England in the first place, and has served the purpose of exhausting Germany to the point of ensuring ultimate Allied victory. On the other hand, the British fight with their backs against the wall. Propaganda in playing down Russian defeat must not revive British complacency.

4. Mexico.

Historical traditional hostility to the United States is decreasing. Influence of Axis-inspired groups and Axis propaganda will increase and may cause neutralization and internal disorder. If Russia makes a truce, communist elements in Mexico (and other Latin American countries) will oppose war and add to internal confusion.

5. Central America.

Participation is due largely to American good-neighbor efforts and dependency (financial and economic) on U.S. Efforts to reverse policy will be made.

6. Ireland.

Little change in Irish position of neutrality.

7. Australia.

No decrease in the will-to-fight but a heightening of the general feeling that home defense comes first and that Japan is the first enemy.

8. New Zealand.

Same as Australia.

9. General Remarks on Area A.

The will-to-fight is well established only in Canada. The prospect of a long-continued stalemate would encourage appeasers, native fascist groups, and revive isolationism. With a prolonging of stalemates

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in Europe and a possible loss of Areas V-1 and ABB-3, all these nations, U.S., Canada, and Great Britain would be increasingly receptive to offers of negotiated peace with slight concessions from status quo by the Axis.

AREA A-1:

1. Brazil.

Brazil is not on the verge of following war on Germany. This is because of minority elements that are pro-Axis and a general tradition of jealousy and suspicion of the U.S. In the case of failure of the prospect of an Allied victory these forces would neutralize Brazilian action and produce confusion in aims.

2. Argentina and Chile.

Popular sentiment favors Allied nations even more than in Brazil, but influential leaders favor the Axis. If prospects of Allied victory diminish, both nations will tend to remain neutral with increasing receptivity toward Axis propaganda and aims.

3. General Remarks on Area A-1.

South America in general is not stirred to join the Allied nations and is detached in attitude, waiting to see which side is likely to win. In case of diminished prospects of Allied victory, all three nations will offer opportunity for Axis propaganda and infiltration.

AREA A-2:

1. South Africa.

Axis sentiments of minorities are now embarrassing and would increase. War efforts of South Africa might be neutralized. Presence of U.S. forces would strongly counter Axis gains.

AREA B:

1. Germany.

Nazi control of Germany is not threatened and under the assumed conditions many of the present difficulties with home population and foreign workers will diminish. German psychological position will be strong.

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2. Assumed Conditions.

The assumed conditions will diminish resistance in the occupied areas, particularly France, Norway and Czechoslovakia. This applies equally to Germany's allies, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria.

3. Sweden.

Strong sympathy with Norway now prevailing in Sweden will remain unaltered if Russia is neutralized. Actual cooperation with Germany in supply of munitions, etc., would be maintained. Sweden's policy, like that of other smaller nations now neutral would be necessarily determined by prospective outcome.

AREA B-1.

Considerable increase in pro-Axis sentiment and reduction in British and United Nations prestige may be expected.

AREA B-2.1. North Africa.

The situation assumed would be accepted in North Africa and that area would become a German sphere of influence and increased economic collaboration.

AREA C.1. JAPAN.

If the neutralization of Russia occurred after serious impairment of Russia's war capacity, Japan could be expected to take advantage of this situation to move into Siberia. Japan is the best controlled of all the nations now at war. Her will-to-fight may be expected to increase rather than diminish. There is in Japan no group or party that is capable of effective resistance to the government.

AREA C-1.1. Philippines and M.A.I.

Japanese domination in this area is comparatively secure. The native populations can not be expected to give any support to the United Nations or to engage in any sabotage of the Japanese program. This is less true of the Philippines, but even there no serious un-

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account to the Japanese is to be expected. Japanese propaganda and agents have had much effect in this area.

ANNA-12.**1. China.**

The effect of the situation on the Chinese might be complex. Free China has a number of conflicting elements in it. The former communist group in the North might react quite differently from the Chiang Kai-shek factions. Certain sections in the South, in particular, Yunnan, have frequently been apathetic to the war against Japan. The United States would be the only remaining hope of the Chinese. Thus, if the Chinese calculated that the United States had not adequately helped Russia (whether from policy or from practical difficulties) and that concrete prospects of effective aid from us were slim, China, or certain sections of China, might make a separate peace with Japan.

ANNA-13.**1. Russia.**

Danger of Russian surrender to Germany is not remote. Russian retreat beyond the Urals has been long planned and provided for as a last resort. A successful German drive into Russia might end in armistice which would remove Russia from active fighting. There is no reason to expect Russia to keep her agreement to fight with Great Britain and the United States to the end. As soon as Russian interests indicate a truce, that may be expected.

ANNA-14.**1. India.**

Japan has the advantage over Germany in a psychological approach to India. Japanese treatment of other native groups in Asia will be a strong factor in determining the ultimate attitude of the Indians.

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II. CONCLUSIONS

With the collapse of Russia, the United Nations will have suffered a psychological defeat, and Axis prestige will rise in neutral and occupied countries.

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SECRET**II A 1 a (4) ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~**

Germany's psychological situation following a Russian collapse would show considerable improvement, providing some relief of the present stringency in the territory controlled by her were obtained. Her control of conquered populations is dependent almost entirely upon force, and this control would become firmer through the knowledge that more German troops had become available for police purposes. It is probable that underground opposition would diminish, and that a general rush to get on the band wagon might develop. However, it must be remembered that the Germans have a singular gift for antagonizing the inhabitants of conquered territories, and their Army commanders are fully aware of the bad psychological effects of the actions of the SS and Gestapo.

II A 1 b (4) ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~**4. Psychological.**

The psychological objectives of Germany in the various areas are listed below:

AREA A.**(a) United States.**

Negotiated peace. Propaganda line would emphasize futility of war, bolshevism, isolationism, Jewish capitalism, Japanese peril, preservation of Australia and New Zealand, and advantages of white racial superiority.

To keep U.S. out of European theater. Emphasize on home defense, labor programs, sabotage, internal confusion, Japanese peril.

(b) Canada.**(1) ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~**

Same as for U.S. Special appeals directed at French Canadians.

(c) Mexico and Central America.**(1) ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~**

To place pressure on U.S. for negotiated peace.
Stress on value to Mexico of economic relations with New Order.

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Appeals to Catholic hierarchy based on destruction of
Belshazzar.

(2) ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

To separate from U.S. increased activity of
German agents in creating internal troubles requiring U.S.
interference. Special appeals to native fascist groups.

(4) ~~England~~

(1) ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Negotiated peace. Isolation of Britain from
other allies. Japanese threat to remaining British territories.
Offer of position in New Order with independent status. Values
of economic collaboration. Attack similar to that used with U.S.

(2) ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

To keep England out of European theater. Threats
to British territories and invasion threats. Racial appeals.
Anti-Jewish agitation.

(3) ~~Australia~~

(1) ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

To separate Australia from United Nations.
Isolation and home defense emphasized. Japanese peril played up.
Trade with Central Europe emphasized.

~~AREA A-1.~~

(a) ~~Brazil~~

(1) ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Same as for Mexico. Band of large German, Japanese
and Italian groups in Brazil would be materially strengthened.
Internal pressure and sabotage by sympathetic Axis groups.

(b) ~~Argentina and Chile~~

(1) ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

To use Argentina and Chile as sources of pressure
on other L. A. countries. Favorable trade treaties with these coun-
tries and bad trade records of U.S. add to difficulties in U.S.
relations to strengthen loyalty of German blood Argentines and

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SECRET**(a) South Africa.****(1) ~~Summary~~**

To separate from other United Nations.
Internal disorders and sabotage by sympathetic Axis groups.
Threats of blockade. Emphasis on native danger to whites.

(2) ~~Summary~~

To convince of values of economic collaboration with New Order.

ANNEX.**(a) Germany.**

To maintain morale and will to fight long war. Promises to have front of achievements of New Order and increased consumer goods production and food. The secure position of Germany emphasized. Continuation of war hardships blamed on England and U.S.

(b) Germanic Countries.

To reduce internal friction and gain active collaboration with Germany. Hopelessness of situation and values of support and participation in New Order.

(c) Sweden.

To bring Sweden actively into the New Order. Threats and promises and war of nerves following the usual Nazi pattern.

(d) Turkey.

To bring Turkey actively into New Order. Line of attack similar to that used with Sweden.

ANNEX I.**(a) Arabia and Iran.**

To promote internal revolt and establishment of sympathetic Axis to government. Increased activity of Axis

SECRET

SECRET**(a) South Africa.****(1) Primary Objectives:**

To separate from other United Nations.
Internal disorders and sabotage by sympathetic Axis groups.
Threats of blockade. Emphasis on native danger to whites.

(2) Secondary Objectives:

To convince of values of economic collaboration with New Order.

ARMA II.**(a) Germany.**

To maintain morale and will to fight long war. Promises to home front of achievements of New Order and increased consumer goods production and food. The secure position of Germany emphasized. Continuation of war hardships blamed on England and U.S.

(b) Germanic Countries.

To reduce internal friction and gain active collaboration with Germany. Hopelessness of situation and values of support and participation in New Order.

(c) Sweden.

To bring Sweden actively into the New Order. Threats and promises and war of nerves following the usual Nazi pattern.

(d) Turkey.

To bring Turkey actively into New Order. Line of attack similar to that used with Sweden.

ARMA III.**(a) Arabia and Iran.**

To promote internal revolt and establishment of sympathetic Axis to government. Increased activity of Axis

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agents among Arabs. Emphasis on British attempts to establish Jewish nation in Palestine.

AREA 2.**(a) North Africa.**

To create internal disorders and turn Arab, and French groups against U.S.

AREA 3.**(a) Japan.**

To keep opposition between Japan and U.S. at white heat. Emphasis on American threat to Japanese empire and offer of economic support in Japanese war effort.

To avoid conflict with Japan

AREA 4.**(a) Philippines and HK.**

To promote economic collaboration between these areas and Germany.

AREA 5.**(a) Manchuria, China.**

To keep China intact as a possible hindrance to further Japanese expansion. Some promises of indirect aid and economic support.

To wean China away from United Nations.

Isolation of China and emphasis on Germany as a possible protector of China against Japan.

AREA 6.**(a) Russia.**

To obtain active cooperation and economic aid from conquered Russian peasants. Situation similar to that of occupied countries.

To promote overthrow of present government.

Promise of peace and recognition of new government and place in New Order. Promote Anti-Jewish feeling. Protection from Japanese aggression a side issue.

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India.

To separate from England. Promise of position in New Order and independent status. Increased activity of Axis agents to promote internal disorders. Fear of Japanese domination could be used to further collaboration with Germany.

To convince of value of economic collaboration and shipment of raw materials to Germany. Maintain conflict between Moslem and Hindu, thus preventing unity.

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SECRET**SECRET**II-B-1-(a)-(1) Enemies in Area U - Situationh. Psychological.

Japan's main psychological problem is the fulfillment of her promises of a short war and increased prosperity for the home population. The war with China has now lasted over 5 years. The immediate successes of Japan in the South Pacific have undoubtedly done much to overcome the unfavorable effects of the long drawn out Chinese incident.

The maintenance of high morale in Japan will depend upon the extent to which Japan is able to fulfill promises of prosperity and the extent to which the home population can be protected from air raids. Failure to accomplish either objective would tend to create opposition to further war effort.

External to Japan itself is the problem of control of the native populations in the conquered areas.

II-B-1-b-(4) Enemies in Area O - Effect Desired.h. Psychological.

The psychological objectives of Japan in the various areas are listed below:

AREA A.(a) United States.(1) ~~Primary Objectives:~~

Negotiated peace. Propaganda line would emphasize futility of war, isolationism, Japanese strength in Pacific, internal confusion, America for Americans.

(2) ~~Alternative Objectives:~~

To keep U.S. out of Pacific theater. Propaganda line emphasizing spheres of influence, internal troubles, Japanese strength, Nazi threat in Atlantic.

(b) Canada.(1) ~~Primary Objectives:~~

Same as for U.S.

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SECRET**SECRET**(a) Mexico and Central America(1) ~~Policy objective:~~

Same as Germany, except greater emphasis upon benefits of trade with GHA Co-prosperity Sphere. Open for Japanese colonization.

(d) England.(1) ~~Policy objective:~~

Negotiated peace. Isolation of British territories in Pacific. German threats to British Isles. Economic value of collaboration with Japanese territories.

(2) ~~Alternative objective:~~

To keep British forces out of Pacific theater.
German threats to British Isles.

(e) Australia.(1) ~~Policy objective:~~

To separate Australia from United Nations and to negotiate separate peace. Isolation of Australia emphasized and value of collaboration in Co-prosperity Sphere.

(2) ~~Alternative objective:~~

To prevent offensive action of Australian forces outside of Australia. Emphasis on isolation and home defense.

AREA A-1.(a) Brazil.(1) ~~Policy objective:~~

Same as for Mexico. Open for Japanese colonization.

(b) Argentina and Chile.(1) ~~Policy objective:~~

To use Argentina and Chile as centers for Japanese propaganda and subversive activities in L. A. and U.S.

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SECRET**SECRET**AREA A-1.(a) South Africa.(1) [REDACTED]

To isolate South Africa from United Nations. Emphasis on economic collaboration with GKA Co-prosperity Sphere. Open for Japanese colonisation.

AREA B.(a) Germany.(1) [REDACTED]

To maintain active German military resistance to United Nations, with particular emphasis upon North Africa and England.

(b) Occupied Countries.(1) [REDACTED]

To further collaboration with Germany.

(c) Sweden.(1) [REDACTED]

Bring Sweden under Axis control.

(d) Turkey.(1) [REDACTED]

Bring Turkey under Axis control.

AREA B-1.(a) Arabia and Iran.(1) [REDACTED]

To create opposition to United Nations.

AREA B-2.(a) North Africa.(1) [REDACTED]

To create opposition to United Nations.

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SECRETAREA C.(a) Japan.(1) Primary objective.

To maintain will to fight and morale of the home population in the face of constant fear of air attack.

AREA C-1.(a) Philippines and NEI.(1) Primary objective.

To gain active support from native populations.

Open for Japanese colonization.

AREA C-2.(a) Chungking, China.(1) Primary objective.

To overthrow Chiang Kai-shek government and to negotiate peace with pro-Japanese groups, establishing puppet government, or consolidate under Wang Ching Wei.

AREA B-0.(a) Russia.(1) Primary objective.

To obtain active economic collaboration.

AREA ADC-3.(a) India.(1) Primary objective.

To separate from England. Promise of position in GEA Co-prosperity Sphere. Increased activity of Japanese agents and support of nationalist independent movements.

(2) Secondary objective.

To promote economic collaboration between India and Japan.

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SECRET**SECRET**III-A-2-d UNITED NATIONS - SITUATION.4. Psychological.(a) General.

An important task of the United Nations is to keep all members, particularly Russia and China, in active participation. In China capitulation is remote as long as aid continues.

Continued cooperation among the United Nations will be affected by military successes by U.S. and Britain.

To achieve this, military operations and propaganda must be closely coordinated.

(b) German Theater.

In this theatre the Axis has the psychological advantage. The hostility in the occupied countries to the German conquerors is the strongest element of United Nations' psychological strength.

(c) Japanese Theater.

In this theater the Axis has the psychological advantage. Language and cultural differences between the United Nations and the native populations are greater than they are between the Japanese and the native populations.

Japanese propaganda of "independence" and "Asia for Asiatics" undoubtedly have an appeal for the native groups which few of the United Nations have yet been able to equal. Dutch and English ruling groups failed to win the support of the natives. In this respect Japan's hand is materially strengthened. Non-support of the Japanese by native groups would not necessarily mean that they would actively support the United Nations.

In the Philippines, the United Nations psychological position is slightly stronger. Some support for U.N. action may be expected from Filipinos.

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SECRET**III-A-6-1. United Nations - Effect England.****4. Psychological.**

The psychological objectives of the United Nations in the various areas are listed below:

AREA A.**(a) United States.**

To create will to fight, increase war effort and prevent hostility to allies. Counter propaganda against internal divisions on race, labor and religious fronts and against isolationism.

(b) Canada.

Same as for U.S. Closer collaboration between U.S. and Canada and development of offensive spirit. Bring French Canadians into the family.

(c) Mexico and Central America.

To prevent Axis from using Mexico as a base for U.S. sabotage. Emphasis on good neighbor policy, action of Mexican aviators and others in war effort, general propaganda following lines of Wallace's speech.

(d) England.

To maintain cooperative war effort.

(e) Australia.

To maintain resistance against Japan. Military assistance of United States emphasized. Common war aims and interests played up.

AREA A-1.**(a) Brazil.**

To commit Brazil to active participation in war against Axis. Economic and military assistance emphasized in propaganda.

(b) Argentina and Chile.

To convince of eventual United Nations' victory.

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and cause breach with Axis.

To create friction between these countries and Axis and to commit to active participation in war.

To increase economic collaboration with U.S. and to prevent Axis moves in this direction.

ANSA.Am.

(a) South Africa.

To maintain South African participation in war.

Propaganda left largely to Great Britain. Propaganda should emphasize Japanese threat to South African countries and bad treatment of Dutch by Axis.

ANSA.R.

(a) Germany/K.

To impair German war effort. Propaganda lines should emphasize American participation, counter 'Goebbels' 'win or die' by showing German labor and other classes interest in United Nations' victory. Emphasis upon U.S. war aims and increased fear of SS and Gestapo.

(b) Germany/V.

To maintain non cooperation in German production. Propaganda should emphasize American participation. Conviction of United Nations' victory is chief determinant of attitudes.

(c) Sweden.

(1) Entrenchment.

To prevent cooperation with Germany. Propaganda should emphasize treatment of other Scandinavian countries.

(4) Turkey.

To prevent cooperation with Axis. Propaganda should

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be directed toward convincing of ultimate United Nations' victory. Emphasis placed upon American participation.

ANNA 2-1.

(a) Arabia and Jews.

To minimize interference with United Nations' war activities and to gain cooperation. Propaganda should emphasize limitation of Jews to Palestine.

ANNA 2-2.

(a) North Africa.

To maintain friendly cooperation with native populations and to minimize friction between Arab, Jews, French and Spanish inhabitants.

ANNA 3.

(a) Japan.

To play up Japanese fear of invasion and bombings in order to prevent use of Japanese forces in South Pacific or India.

ANNA 4-1.

(a) Philippines and M.H.I.

To maintain belief in ultimate Japanese defeat and to encourage internal disorders and sabotage. Emphasis should be placed on American treatment of Philippines.

ANNA 4-2.

(a) Guoching, China.

To prevent overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek government and separate peace with Japan.

ANNA 5.

(a) Russia.

To preserve present political and military organization so as to require maximum German strength on east front.

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(a) **SECRET**

To secure Indian resistance to Japan and cooperation with Great Britain. Propaganda emphasis on world order as envisioned by Wallace and Roosevelt. Evil Japanese practices in conquered territories should be emphasized.

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SECRETSTRENGTH FACTORSE. PsychologicalAxis

Both Germany and Japan have adequate control of the home populations and even severe reverses, at first, will not threaten the security of control.

Japanese rule as the savior of Asia and the colored races has been effective in areas where British, and to a lesser extent Dutch rule, did not establish loyalty.

Japanese and German victories thus far have prepared subject areas and neutrals for resignation to Axis domination. While the European sabotage rate is rising, many people are becoming more resigned to cooperation with the Axis. This sentiment varies, however, with conviction of Axis victory or defeat.

The German will to fight has been greatly strengthened by threats of what will happen to them after the war is over.

Japanese will to fight has been strengthened by teaching that it is an honor to die for country, and dishonor of being captured by enemy.

A long period of governmental indoctrination has created a unified public opinion at home which is faithfully promoted by government spokesmen and leaders. This is particularly true of the younger generation doing the fighting.

PsychologicalUnited Nations

Popular will to win is slowly growing in the United States, England, Canada and Australia. Reverses will not diminish this but will lead to demands for changes in government and elimination of "defense" leadership and substitution of determined, non-political, "win the war" government.

Russian control of home population gives no sign of breaking. Defense spirit will not admit capitulation even if retreat to Urals occurs.

Chinese resistance to Japan will continue. As United Nations assistance increases, China's morale should improve.

United Nations' operations in the Philippines will find support from the native population -- enough to assist intelligence and agents and to provide some manpower.

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SECRETWEAKNESS FACTORSA. PsychologicalAxis

Germany and Italy have now been making maximum war effort for two and one half years longer than the United States. Apathy toward the war and defeatism may be expected sooner than in the United States and Great Britain.

German policy in the invaded or dominated areas has provoked strong anti-German feeling. The sabotage rate is about double that of November 1941.

Manpower is short in Germany and replacements from other countries (8,146,000 acknowledged in May) are not efficient in production.

There is no actual agreement in German and Japanese war aims. The eventual aims of Germany and Japan will bring the two countries into conflict, there is open German dislike of Japan and disdain of Italy.

PsychologicalUnited Nations

British policy has developed in British colonies, particularly India and Egypt, strong anti-British nationalist movements which are open to Axis propaganda and promises, and which threaten internal sabotage.

The failure of mutual understanding between Russia and the other members of the United Nations and the existence of strong anti-Russian leanings in the population and leadership of Great Britain and the United States will operate to make a Russo-German armistice a possibility. Only effective military aid, not sentiment or promises will keep Russia actively fighting Germany. Jews in government positions strengthen German accusations.

Program of the Atlantic Charter has little appeal in Europe or anywhere else and failed to touch on the status of India and the colored races.

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SECRET**1-10-5) Propaganda Section****I. Assessment of Propaganda Section in Areas**
AREA A.**1. United States**

The reaction of the American public to the assumed situation is critical. For people in Allied countries are now orientated toward the United States and the future military role. Public opinion experts report that in general the average American has little conception of Russia's role in the war. Russia is a vague, far-off place with immense areas, where people are doing a good job of defending their country. The American people do not see that the lot of Russia is important in our own military effort. Thus, their reaction to the assumed situation is likely to be that of only momentary sympathetic regret. Thus, the public would, if affected at all, show a heightened will-to-fight, enhancing the characteristic, though unrealistic, attitude that the United States will have to win the war pretty much herself. Confusion and disillusionment would occur only later with specific and continued reverses of American armed forces.

2. Canada

Public opinion is much like that in the United States. There is little reaction to Russia's role, the orientation being toward the United States and England. Some elements of the people (the French Canadians) are not highly enthusiastic about the war even now, but in general the Canadians would follow the reaction of the United States.

3. England

The present general will-to-fight is indeed high, but that the assumed situation would not demoralize it is not so certain. Confidential opinion studies in England reveal that the English have very much identified their prospects with the continued fight by the Russians. These studies reveal that the English show a high degree of confidence, hope and belief in Russia. Thus, the assumed situation may result in a greater reduction of a will-to-fight. The degree of demoralization would be contingent on (1) the

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value of direct aid from America and (2) skill and courage of the Allied propagandists in developing the theme that the Russian campaign was a fortunate break for England in the first place, and has served the purpose of exhausting Germany to the point of securing ultimate Allied victory.

4. Mexico.

Mexico's participation is now less determined than that of U.S. Tradition hostile to U.S. and influence of Axis-inspired groups and Axis propaganda leaves open possible neutralization and internal disorder. If Russia makes a truce, strong communist elements in Mexico (and other Latin American countries) will oppose war and add to internal confusion.

5. Central America.

Participation is due largely to American good-neighbor efforts and dependency (financial and economic) on U.S. Violent efforts to reverse policy will be made.

6. Ireland.

Little change in Irish position of neutrality.

7. Australia.

No decrease in the will-to-fight but a heightening of the general feeling that home defense comes first and that Japan is the first enemy.

8. New Zealand.

Same as Australia.

General Remarks on Area A.

The will-to-fight is well established only in Canada. The prospect of a long-continued stalemate would encourage appeasers, native fascist groups, and revive isolationism.

With a prolonging of stalemate in Europe and possible loss of Areas B-1, ABC-2, and ABC-3, all three nations, U.S., Canada and Great Britain would be increasingly receptive to offers of negotiated peace with slight concessions from status-quo by the Axis.

Area A-1.

1) Brazil.

Brazil is not on the verge of declaring war on Germany. This is

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because of many elements that are pro-Axis and a general tradition of jealousy and suspicion of the U.S. In the case of failure of prospect of Allied victory these forces would neutralize Brazilian action and produce confusion in aims.

/6. Argentina and Chile.

Popular sentiment favors Allied nations even more than in Brazil, but influential leaders favor the Axis. If prospects of Allied victory diminish, both nations will tend to remain neutral with increasing receptivity toward Axis propaganda and aims.

General Remarks on Area I-1.

South America in general is not stirred to join the Allied nations and is detached in attitude, waiting to see which side is likely to win. In case of diminished prospects of Allied victory, all three nations will offer opportunity for Axis infiltration and possible air operations, directed against Panama.

AREA I-2.

// South Africa

Axis commitments are now embarrassing and would be strongly reinforced. War efforts of South Africa might be neutralized. Presence of U.S. forces would strongly counter Axis gains.

AREA I-1.

Considerable increase in pro-Axis sentiment and reduction in British prestige.

AREA I-2.

/7. North Africa.

The situation assumed would be accepted in North Africa and that area would become a German sphere of influence and increased economic collaboration.

AREA II.

/8. Japan.

If the neutralization of Russia occurred after serious impairment of Russia's war capacity, Japan could be expected to take advantage of this situation to move into Siberia, and to threaten Alaska.

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Japan is the best controlled and integrated of all the nations now at war. Her will-to-fight and capacity to fight may be expected to increase rather than diminish. There is in Japan no group or party that is capable of effective resistance to the government.

AREA 1.

1/1. Philippines and NEI.

Japanese domination in this area is comparatively secure. The native populations can not be expected to give any support to the United Nations or to engage in any sabotage of the Japanese program. This is less true of the Philippines, but even there no serious endorsement to the Japanese is to be expected. Japanese propaganda and agents have had great effect in this area.

AREA 2.

1/2. China.

The effect of the situation on the Chinese might be complex. Free China has a number of conflicting elements in it. The former communist group in the North might react quite differently from the Chiang Kai-shek factions. Certain sections in the North, in particular, Yunnan, have frequently been apathetic to the war against Japan. Here, again, public reaction in the United States and our consequent policy and practice is critical. The United States would be the only remaining hope of the Chinese. Thus, if the Chinese calculated that the United States had not adequately helped Russia (whether from policy or from practical difficulties) and that concrete prospects of effective aid from us were slim, China, or certain sections of China, might make a deal with Japan.

AREA 3.

1/3. Russia.

Danger of Russian surrender to Germany is not remote. Russian retreat beyond the Urals has been long planned and provided for as a last resort. There is, however, grave danger that successful German drive into Russia might end in armistice which would remove Russia from active fighting. There is no reason to expect Russia to keep her agreement to fight with Great Britain and the United States to the end. As soon as Russian inter-

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note indicates a trend, that may be expected.

AREA A-4.

17. India.

Increased threat of a German drive to the east would strengthen Indian passive resistance to British control. Japanese propaganda would be increasingly effective. Japan has the advantage over Germany in a psychological approach to India. Japanese treatment of other native groups in Asia will be a strong factor in determining the ultimate attitude of the Indians.

AREA B.

18. Germany.

Real control of Germany is not threatened and under the assumed conditions many of the present difficulties with home population and foreign workers will diminish. German psychological position will be strong.

Assumed Conditions.

The assumed conditions will diminish resistance in the occupied areas, particularly France, Norway and Czechoslovakia. This applies equally to Germany's allies, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria.

19. Sweden.

Strong sympathy with Norway now prevailing in Sweden will remain unaltered if Russia is neutralized. Actual cooperation with Germany in supply of munitions, etc., would be maintained. Sweden's policy, like that of other smaller nations now neutral would be necessarily determined by prospective actions.

II. Conclusions.

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Germany's psychological position following a Russian collapse would be exceedingly good.

Germany is faced with the problem of obtaining cooperation from the people in the occupied areas and the dissemination of public opinion as a result of continued sabotage and internal disorders. This would diminish after a Russian collapse.

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II-2-1-(a)-(4) Review in Area 2 - Situation

4. Psychological

Japan's main psychological problem is the fulfillment of her promise of a short war and increased prosperity for the home population. The war with China has now lasted over 5 years. The immediate successes of Japan in the North Pacific have undoubtedly done much to overcome the unfavorable effects of the Long March and Chinese incident.

The maintenance of high morale in Japan will depend upon the extent to which Japan is able to import for home consumption raw materials from the conquered areas and the extent to which the home population can be protected from air raids. Failure to accomplish either objective would be a most important contributing factor to a breakdown of public opinion and the creation of opposition to a continuance of the war, but no effective steps towards either end have yet been taken.

External to Japan itself is the problem of control of the native populations in the conquered areas. Imports will be dependent to some degree upon the amount of native cooperation Japan is able to obtain. If some semblance of native rule is granted, Japan's problem will not be so serious.

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XIL-4-4

UNITED NATIONS - SIXTH PART.**4. Psychological.****(a) General.**

The chief task of the United Nations is to keep all nations, particularly Russia and China, in active participation. In China capitulation is remote, but reverses could result in an armistice between Germany and Russia, which would free forces for operations elsewhere. In both countries propaganda should supplement aid.

Continued cooperation among the United Nations will depend on military successes by U.S. and Britain.

To achieve this, military operations and propaganda must be closely coordinated.

(b) German Thinking.

Of the United Nations, the United States is in the best position to influence the native groups of North Africa. America's reputation for fairness and economic disinterest would facilitate active cooperation from these groups.

Independence movements would be strengthened but these could be expected to cooperate more closely with the United States than with English, French, Spanish, or German authorities.

Attitudes of the French population are somewhat indifferent or slightly hostile to the British, but are extremely friendly to the Americans. French inhabitants could be expected to look with favor upon United States successful action. The French are very hungry and will turn to the cause promising them relief.

Some Spanish groups are sympathetic to the Axis. It is not likely, however, that activities of these groups would precipitate a crisis, though German psychological attack would be directed toward this end.

German activities would follow the familiar pattern of stirring up internal conflict. Arabs would be pitted against Jews; French and Spanish groups would be encouraged to oppose

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the U.S. etc.

In general, however, the United Nations would have the psychological advantage. American money and supplies flowing into the area would create a period of prosperity for the small business and merchant class. The presence of American forces coupled with the economic situation would tend to offset any Axis propaganda directed to this area.

(c) ~~Japanese Theater.~~

In this theater the Axis has the psychological advantage. Language and cultural differences between the United Nations and the native populations are greater than they are between the Japanese and the native populations.

Japanese propaganda of "independence" and aid for Asia" undoubtedly have an appeal for the native groups which few of the United Nations have yet been able to equal. Dutch and English ruling groups failed to win the support of the natives. In this respect Japan's hand is materially strengthened. Japanese domination will require some time to become as distasteful as Dutch or English rule. Non-support of the Japanese by native groups would not necessarily mean that they would actively support the United Nations.

In the Philippines, the United Nations has a strong psychological advantage. Filipinos can be depended upon to support United Nations' action more than any other group in the area.

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IX-1-1-b-(4)

Exercise in Area B - Effect Desired.

h. Psychological.

The psychological objectives of Germany in the various areas are listed below:

AREA A.

(a) United States.

(1) Primary objectives:

Negotiated peace. Propaganda line would emphasize futility of war, bolshevism, isolationism, Japanese peril, preservation of Australia and New Zealand.

(2) Alternative objectives:

To keep U.S. out of European theater. Emphasize on home defense, L.A. problems, sabotage, internal confusion, Japanese peril.

(b) Canada.

(1) Objectives:

Same as for U.S. Special appeals directed at French Canadians.

(c) Mexico and Central America.

(1) Primary objectives:

To place pressure on U.S. for negotiated peace. Stress on value to Mexico of economic relations with New Order. Appeals to Catholic hierarchy based on destruction of bolshevism.

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(K) Secondary objectives:

To separate from U.S. Increased activity of German agents in creating internal troubles requiring U.S. interference. Special appeals to native fascist groups.

(d) England.

(1) Primary objective:

Negotiated peace. Isolation of Britain from other allies. Japanese threat to remaining British territories. Offer of position in New Order with independent status. Values of economic collaboration. Attack similar to that used with U.S.

(2) Alternative objective:

To keep England out of European theater. Threats to British territories and invasion threats.

(e) Australia.

(1) Primary objective:

To separate Australia from United Nations. Isolation and home defense emphasized. Japanese peril played up.

AREA A-1.

(a) Brazil.

(1) Objectives:

Same as for Mexico. Band of large German and Italian groups in Brazil would be materially strengthened. Internal pressure and sabotage by sympathetic Axis groups.

(b) Argentina and Chile.

(1) Primary objective:

To use Argentina and Chile as sources of pressure on other I. A. countries. Favorable trade treaties with these countries and use of ships for transport to Europe to add to difficulties in U.S. relations.

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AREA A-2.

(a) South Africa.

(1) Primary objectives:

To separate from other United Nations.
Internal disorders and sabotage by sympathetic Axis groups.
Threats of blockade.

(2) Secondary objectives:

To convince of values of economic collaboration with New Order.

AREA B.

(a) Germany.

(1) Primary objectives:

To maintain morale and will to fight long war. Promises to home front of achievements of New Order and increased consumer production. The secure position of Germany emphasized. Continuation of war and hardships blamed on England and U.S.

(b) Occupied Countries.

(1) Primary objectives:

To reduce internal friction and gain active collaboration with Germany. Hopelessness of situation and values of support and participation in New Order.

(c) Sweden.

(1) Primary objectives:

To bring Sweden actively into the
Threats and promises and war of nerves following the
pattern.

(d) Turkey.

(1) Primary objectives:

To bring Turkey actively into New
of attack similar to that used with Sweden.

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AREA B-1.

(a) Arabia and Iraq.

(1) Primary objectives:

To promote internal revolt and establishment of sympathetic Axis government. Increased activity of Axis agents among Arabs.

AREA B-2.

(a) North Africa.

(1) Primary objectives:

To create internal disorders and turn Arab, French and Spanish groups against U.S.

AREA C.

(a) Japan.

(1) Primary objectives:

To keep opposition between Japan and U.S. at white heat. Emphasis on American threat to Japanese empire and offer of economic support in Japanese war effort.

(2) Secondary objectives:

To keep Japan's attention focused on south and east and away from India.

AREA C-1.

(a) Philippines and HRI.

(1) Primary objectives:

To promote economic collaboration between these areas and Germany through Japan.

AREA C-2.

(a) Chunqing, China.

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(1) Primary objective:

To keep China in action as a possible threat to further Japanese expansion. Some promise of indirect aid and economic support.

(2) Alternative objective:

To wean China away from United Nations. Isolation of China and emphasis on Germany as a possible protector of China against Japan.

AREA B-C.

(a) Russia.

(1) Primary objective:

To obtain active cooperation and economic aid from conquered Russian peasants. Situation similar to that of occupied countries.

(2) Secondary objective:

To promote overthrow of present government. Promise of peace and recognition of new government and place in New Order. Protection from Japanese aggression a side issue.

AREA ABC-2.

(a) India.

(1) Primary objective:

To separate from England. Promise of position in New Order and independent status. Increased activity of Axis agents to promote internal disorders. Fear of Japanese domination could be used to further collaboration with Germany.

(2) Secondary objective:

To convince of value of economic collaboration and shipment of raw materials to Germany.

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II-2-1-4-(4)

Propaganda in Area C - Effect Desired.

4. Psychological.

The psychological objectives of Japan in the various areas are listed below:

AREA A.

(a) United States.

(1) Primary objectives:

Negotiated peace. Propaganda line would emphasize futility of war, isolationism, Japanese strength in Pacific, internal confusion, America for Americans.

(2) Alternative objectives:

To keep U.S. out of Pacific theater. Propaganda line emphasizing spheres of influence, internal troubles, Japanese strength, Nazi threat in Atlantic.

(b) Canada.

(1) Objectives:

Same as for U.S.

(c) Mexico and Central America.

(1) Primary objectives:

Same as Germany, except greater emphasis upon benefits of trade with GEA Co-prosperity Sphere.

(d) England.

(1) Primary objectives:

Negotiated peace. Isolation of British territories in Pacific. German threats to British Isles. Economic value of collaboration with Japanese territories.

(2) Alternative objectives:

To keep British forces out of Pacific theater. German threats to British Isles.

SECRET(a) Australia.(1) Primary objective:

To separate Australia from United Nations and to negotiate separate peace. Isolation of Australia emphasized and value of collaboration in Co-prosperity Sphere.

(2) Secondary objective:

To prevent offensive action of Australian forces outside of Australia. Emphasis on isolation and home defense.

AREA A-1.(a) Brazil.(1) Objectives:

Same as for Mexico.

(b) Argentina and Chile.(1) Primary objective:

To use Argentina and Chile as centers for Japanese propaganda and subversive activities in L. A. and U.S.

AREA A-2.(a) South Africa.(1) Primary objective:

To isolate South Africa from United Nations. Emphasis on economic collaboration with GEA Co-prosperity Sphere.

AREA B.(a) Germany.(1) Primary objective:

To maintain active German military resistance to United Nations, with particular emphasis upon North Africa and England.

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SECRET(b) Occupied Countries-(1) Primary objectives:

To further collaboration with Germany.

(c) Sweden.(1) Primary objectives:

To keep Sweden Neutral.

(d) Turkey.(1) Primary objectives:

To keep Turkey neutral.

AREA B-1.(a) Arabia and Iran.(1) Primary objectives:

To create opposition to United Nations.

AREA B-2.(a) North Africa.(1) Primary objectives:

To create opposition to U.N.

AREA C.(a) Japan.(1) Primary objectives:

To maintain will to fight and morale of the home population in the face of constant fear of air attack.

AREA C-1.(a) Philippines and IRI.(1) Primary objectives:

To gain active co. op. from native populations.

SECRETAREA C-2.(a) Chungking, China.(1) Primary objectives:

To overthrow Chiang Kai-shek government
and to negotiate peace with pro-Japanese groups.

AREA D-C.(a) Kuankia.(1) Primary objectives:

To obtain active economic collaboration.

AREA ABC-1.(a) India.(1) Primary objectives:

To separate from England. Promise of position
in CMA Co-prosperity Sphere and military assistance in overthrow-
ing Britain. Increased activity of Japanese agents and support
of nationalist independent movements.

(2) Secondary objectives:

To promote economic collaboration between
India and Japan.

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III-A-2-1

United Nations - Effect Desired.

4. Psychological.

The psychological objectives of the United Nations in the various areas are listed below:

AREA A.

(a) United States.

(1) Primary objective:

To maintain will to fight and increase war effort and prevent hostility to allies. Counter propaganda against internal divisions on race, labor and religious fronts and against isolationism.

(b) Canada.

(1) Primary objective:

Same as for U.S. Closer collaboration between U.S. and Canada and development of offensive spirit. Counter propaganda to French Canadians.

(c) Mexico and Central America.

(1) Primary objective:

To prevent Axis from using Mexico as a base for U.S. sabotage. Emphasis on good neighbor policy, action of Mexican aviators and others in war effort, general propaganda following lines of Vallarta's speech.

(d) England.

(1) Primary objective:

To maintain cooperative war effort.

(e) Australia.

(1) Primary objective:

To maintain resistance against Japan. Military assistance of United States emphasized. Common war aims and interests played up.

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AREA A-1.

(a) Brazil.

(1) Primary objective:

To commit Brazil to active participation in war against Axis. Economic and military assistance emphasized in propaganda.

(b) Argentina and Chile.

(1) Primary objective:

To convince of essential United Nations' victory.

(2) Secondary objective:

To create friction between these countries and Axis and to commit to active participation in war.

(3) Alternative objective:

To increase economic collaboration with U.S. and to prevent Axis moves in this direction.

AREA A-2.

(a) South Africa.

(1) Primary objective:

To maintain South African participation in war. Propaganda left largely to Great Britain. Propaganda should emphasize Japanese threat to South African countries.

AREA B.

(a) Germany.

(1) Primary objective:

To impair German war effort. Propaganda lines should emphasize American participation, counter each side's "win or die" by showing German labor and other classes possible protection in United Nations' victory. Emphasis upon U.S. war aims and increased fear of Gestapo and Axis.

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SECRET**(b) Germany****(1) Primary objective**

To maintain iron cooperation in German production. Propaganda should emphasize American participation. Conviction of United Nations' victory is chief determinant of of attitudes.

(c) Sweden**(1) Primary objective**

To prevent greater cooperation with Germany. Propaganda should emphasize treatment of other Scandinavian countries.

(d) Turkey**(1) Primary objective**

To prevent cooperation with Axis. Propaganda should be directed toward convincing of ultimate United Nations' victory. Emphasis placed upon American participation.

ARAB I-B-I**(a) Arabia and Iran****(1) Primary objective**

To minimize interference with United Nations' war activities and to gain cooperation.

ARAB I-B-2**(a) North Africa****(1) Primary objective**

To maintain friendly cooperation with native populations and to minimize friction between Arab, Jew, French and Spanish inhabitants.

ARAB G**(a) Japan****(1) Primary objective**

To play up Japanese fear of invasion and bombings in order to prevent use of Japanese forces in South Pacific or India.

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SECRETAREA C-1.(a) Philippines and Luz.(1) Primary objectives:

To maintain belief in ultimate Japanese defeat and to encourage internal disorders and sabotage. Emphasis should be placed on American treatment of Philippines. War aims relating to Pacific area should be fully emphasized when they have been clearly stated.

AREA C-2.(a) Chungking, China.(1) Primary objectives:

To prevent overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek government and separate peace with Japan.

AREA D-1.(a) Russia.(1) Primary objectives:

To preserve present political and military organization: no need to require maximum German strength on east front.

AREA D-2.(a) India.(1) Primary objectives:

To secure Indian resistance to Japan and cooperation with Great Britain. Propaganda emphasis on world order as envisioned by Wallace and Roosevelt. Japanese practices in conquered territories should be emphasized.

SECRET**1. International****Axis**

Both Germany and Japan have adequate control of the home populations and even severe reverses, at first, will not threaten the security of control.

Japanese rule as the savior of Asia and the colored races has been effective in areas where British, and to a lesser extent Dutch rule, did not establish loyalty.

Japanese and German victories thus far have produced jubilation and enthusiasm for resignation to Axis domination. While the European setback rate is rising, many people are becoming more resigned to cooperation with the Axis. This sentiment varies, however, with conviction of Axis victory or defeat.

The German will to fight has been greatly strengthened by threats of what will happen to them after the war is over.

A long period of governmental indoctrination has created a unified public opinion at home which is faithfully promoted by government spokesmen and leaders. This is particularly true of the younger generation doing the fighting.

International**United Nations**

Popular will to win is slowly growing in the United States, England, Canada and Australia. Reverses will not diminish this but will lead to demands for changes in government and elimination of "defense" leadership and substitution of determined, non-political, "win the war" government.

Russian control of home population gives no sign of breaking. Defense spirit will not admit capitulation even if retreat to Urals occurs.

Chinese resistance to Japan will continue. As United Nations' assistance increases, China's morale should improve.

Good American performance in other war theaters support American operations in North and South Africa. Both French, and to a lesser extent Arab opinions holds the United States to be without imperial ambitions in the Mediterranean area.

The United Nations' cause, when given effective formulas and clearly stated, will strengthen United Nations' propaganda if accompanied by military successes.

United Nations' operations in the Philippines will find support from the native population -- enough to assist intelligence and agents and to provide some manpower.

The conviction of United States' potential strength remain well established even in Germany. This will make more prompt the development of defection in Germany and of resistance in the invaded areas as the military development begins to go against the Axis.

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SECRET**2. Psychological****Axis**

Germany and Italy have now been making maximum war effort for two and one half years longer than the United States. Apathy toward the war and defeatism may be expected sooner than in the United States and Great Britain.

German policy in the invaded or dominated areas has provoked strong anti-German feeling. The sabotage rate is about double that of November 1941.

Manpower is short in Germany and replacements from other countries (2,140,000 acknowledged in May) are not efficient in production.

There is no actual agreement in German and Japanese war aims. The eventual aim of Germany and Japan will bring the two countries into conflict, there is open German dislike of Japan and disdain of Italy.

Psychological**United Nations**

British policy has developed in British colonies, particularly India and Egypt, strong anti-British nationalist movements which are open to Axis propaganda and promises, and which threaten internal sabotage.

The failure of actual understanding between Russia and the other members of the United Nations and the existence of strong anti-Russian feelings in the population and leadership of Great Britain and the United States will operate to make a Russo-German armistice a possibility. Only effective military aid, not sentiment or promises will help Russia actively fighting Germany.

Program of the Atlantic Charter has little appeal in Europe or anywhere else and failed to touch on the status of India and the colored races.

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CCS 385 (2-14-42)

S E C R E T

J.C.S. 12COPY NO. 61FEBRUARY 13, 1942.JOINT U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFFPSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARENote by the Secretary

The enclosure is presented by the Joint U.S. Staff Planners for consideration by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

L. R. McDOWELL.

ENCLOSURE

1. The proposals in this paper are intended to implement the directive on subversive activities and propaganda as contained in the American-British Grand Strategy, approved by the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff on December 31, 1941. This grand strategy provides that subversive activity and propaganda will be employed in wearing down and undermining Axis resistance.

2. The scope of activities which includes "subversive activities" and "propaganda", referred to in this paper as psychological warfare, is understood to include all forms of activity and operations, outside of organized military action, calculated to cause a deterioration of the enemy's morale and military effectiveness, or to improve the morale and position of non-belligerent countries towards the United Nations.

3. There are three classes of areas in which psychological warfare can be effective. First, those areas designated as theaters of operations; second, those enemy-controlled areas not included in theaters or operations; and third, non-belligerent areas. For the purpose of indicating strategic responsibility, areas are further classified as those in which the United States

has sole responsibility, those in which Great Britain has sole responsibility, and those where the United States and Great Britain, and in appropriate cases other nations, have joint or common interest.

4. It should be recognized that the fundamental purpose of psychological warfare is to supplement military warfare in such a manner as to contribute to ultimate military success. Acceptance of this fundamental leads to the conclusion that the integration of psychological warfare with military strategy can only be accomplished when direction is given by the military command.

5. The implementation of psychological warfare consists of a planning phase and an operating phase. In each phase the activities of interested agencies will be coordinated to accomplish the military objective.

6. Directives for psychological warfare in active theaters of operation will be included in basic strategical plans. Plans for psychological warfare in other areas will be harmonized with strategical objectives approved by the Joint and/or Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee. Basic strategic planning of psychological warfare must also take cognizance of the interests and facilities of other co-belligerents.

7. The departments of the United States Government directly responsible for basic strategic planning of operations for the conduct of war are the War and Navy Departments. Agencies of the government involved in the implementation of psychological warfare plans are the State, War and Navy Departments, the Department of Justice, the Coordinator of Information, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and the Board of Economic Warfare.

8. Actual drafting of psychological warfare directives for the areas designated as theaters of operations and those enemy controlled areas not included in theaters of operations will be

done by a sub-committee organized for this purpose under the direction of the Joint Staff Planners.

9. The execution of psychological warfare in a theater of operations is a function of command. This requires that no agency be permitted to direct, operate or execute psychological warfare within an organized theater independent of the commander thereof. The personnel and facilities of all government agencies should be employed to the fullest extent under control and direction of the theater commander.

10. The execution of psychological warfare in enemy controlled areas not included in theaters of operations and in non-belligerent areas will be conducted by the appropriate existing agency of the government organized to carry out these duties as already established by executive orders dated July 11, 1941, and July 30, 1941.

11. In order to accomplish basic planning to establish control in the execution of plans, to serve and assist theater commanders in the execution of these plans, and to serve as the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative in contact with all other government agencies involved in psychological warfare, there will be established a Joint War and Navy Department agency charged with these duties. This agency should be a part of or be set up within that section of the existing War or Navy Department organization whose present functions best lend themselves to developing the specific activities to be assigned the agency.

Recommendations.

In order to implement the directive on subversive activities and propaganda as laid down by the combined Chiefs of Staff in the American-British grand strategy the following is recommended:

1. That the principles set forth above for the conduct of psychological warfare and its integration with military strategy be adopted.

2. That a sub-committee of the Joint Staff Planners, composed of two members of the Joint Strategic Committee, two members of the G-2 Division, War Department General Staff, and two members of the Division of Naval Intelligence, Office of Naval Operations, shall be constituted as the Psychological Warfare Committee.

3. That the functions of the Psychological Warfare Committee shall be:

a. In conjunction with subordinate agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the State Department or other existing government agencies, to initiate, formulate and develop plans for Psychological Warfare.

b. Under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee to coordinate psychological warfare of other U. S. governmental agencies and to collaborate with interested nations to the end that all psychological warfare is in accord with approved strategy.

c. As an agency of the War and Navy Departments to be responsible under the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee that psychological warfare is integrated with military strategy.